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OPSOMMING
Inhierdie skripsie val die klem op die rol van biskop Abel Muzorewa in die onafhanklikheidstryd
in Zimbabwe (Rhodesie) tussen 1971 en 1980. Die vemaamste gebeure in die tyd en die
leierskaprol van Muzorewa word bespreek en ontleed. Daar word veral gekyk na die vraagof
hy'n sterk leier in eie reg was ofbloot 'n werktuig in die hande van die blankes.
Na die verbanning van die ANC in 1959 deur die Smith-regering het die swart nasionaliste in
Rhodesie geen interne leier gehad nie. Om die pogings van Smith en die Britte om
onathanklikheid indie gebied deur die swartes goedgekeur te kry teen te staan, het hulle In nuwe
party die African National Council gestig en biskop Muzorewa tot leier verkies. Hoewel geen
politikus nie, het hy sy invloed gebruik om die swart stem teen die blankes te monster om 'n
duidelike negatiewe antwoord op die Pearce Kommissie se ondersoek na onafhanklikheid onder
'n blanke regering te gee.
Muzorewa is daardeur teen wil en dank in die versetpolitiek ingetrek. In die loop van die
sewentigerjare was hy as leier van dieANC betrokke by verskeie onderhandelinge met die blanke
Rhodesian Front Party. Tydens die Victoria-falle konferensie in 1975 het hy weer eens
onwrikbaar bly staan by die swartes se eis om 'n swart meerderheidsregering. Sy taak was nie
maklik nie aangesien die politieke verdeling tussen die swart nasionaliste tot die skepping van
magsblokke ZANUo.Lv. Robert Mugabe en ZAPU o.Iv. Joshua Nkomo, gelei het. Die groepe
was sterk verdeel en teen Muzorewa as binnelandse leier gekant.
Dieverdelings was opvallend tydens die Geneefse Konferensie in 1976 waar Nkomo en Mugabe,
saarngesnoer in diePatriotiese Front, Muzorewageopponeer en die pogings om vrede in Rhodesie
te bewerkstelling vemietig het.
Muzorewa het as leier van die ANC nie veel opsiesgehad nie en het besluit om met Ian Smith en
die Rhodesian Front saam te werk om die gebied tot onafhanklikheid te lei. In 1978 is 'n
ooreenkoms gesluit waarvolgens die gematigde interne leiers die sogenaamde Interim Regering
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gevorm het met Muzorewa as Eerste Minister. Hoewel Muzorewa skerp deur die nasionaliste
gekritiseer is, het hyvoluit probeer om die land finaal tot onafhanklikheid te lei onder 'n swart
regering. Die bevolking van Rhodesie het die planne goedgekeur deur Muzorewa tydens die
eerste demokratiese verkiesing in 1979 oorweldigend te steun.
Die werklike toets vir Muzorewa se leierskap het gekom tydens sy kort termyn as leier van die
Interim Regering en die Carlton House Konferensie in 1979 in Londen om oor die finale
onafhanklikheid van Zimbabwe te onderhandel. As Eerste Minister kon hy nie sy beloftes van
vrede en voorspoed vir aimal nakom nie en tydens die Carlton House Konferensie is hy totaaJ
oorheers deur Lord Carrington en Mugabe. Hy het sonder slag ofstoot afstand gedoen van sy
posisie as EersteMinister ensy hoop gevestig op die steun vandie blanke en swart Zirnbabwiers
tydens die verkiesings in Februarie 1980. Muzorewa is verpletterend verslaan. Sy ideale vir 'n
onafhanklike staat en die metodes wat hy aangewend het om dit te bereik, is totaal deur die
kiesers verwerp. Dit het die feit onderstreep dat hy as geestelike Ieier nie opgewasse was virdie
ongenaakbare politieke arena nie.
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CHAPTER 1.
This mini-dissertation resulted from research for a seminar course work on
"Rhodesia" since 1888, particularly from seminar on "The independence
struggle in Zimbabwe 1971 - 1980." My interest-was stimulated in finding out
more about Bishop Abel Muzorewa especially to discover the underlying
reasons for his desire and actions in the liberation of his country
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia in 1980.
Although various works on the contemporary history ofZimbabwe have been
written, no serious attempts have been made to look into Abel Muzorewa's role
in the liberation struggle. This study, which concentrates on the period from
1971 to 1980 hopes to fill this gap. It will attempt to portray the role the
African National Council (ANC) under the leadership of Bishop Abel
Muzorewa had played in the achievement of genuine independence of
Zimbabwe in 1980.
The main objective ofthis study is to explore whether Muzorewa was a true
liberator or a Smith-puppet in the eyes ofthe people ofZimbabwe/Rhodesia,
The focus ofthe investigation will be on whether Muzorewa was a liberator of
his people. If so, how did he liberate them? What methods did he employ?
Can he be seen as a true spokespersonofthe peopleof Zimbabwe during 1971
to 1980?
In the thesis the role Bishop Abel Muzorewa played will be described and
analysed and his success or failure inbringing about the genuine independence
ofZimbabwelRhodesia in 1980 will beevaluated. This study will probe into the
political strategies of Abel Muzorewa to bring about independence since the
signing of the internal agreement with Ian Smith. His modus operandi will be
analysed andspecial attention will be given to his co-operation but also conflict
with the whites and the other black nationalist leaders.
In analysing his role, various questions will be answered such as: why was he
approached to lead the ANC in 1972? Was he a suitable candidate for the job
(i.e. was he a political leader or just a minister of religion who was unlikely to
be banned by the government?). Was he approached because he was on good
terms with the Smith regime at the time? Was he approached because of his
non-violent creed and non-partisan background that the nationalists were
seeking in order to survive the duration of the test ofAcceptability, if not
longer? Was he approached because the executive of Zimbabwe African
National Union (Zanu) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (Zapu) did not
have anyone who could have filled that position? If indeed, Muzorewa was
chosen as a compromise leader of the ANC at the time, why did he not step
down after the resounding "No" campaign against the Anglo/Rhodesian
proposals? Was he a real politician orjust a figurehead between 1971 and
1980?
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Bishop Abel Muzorewa's role as a politician can be best discussed when
particular attention is given to the following aspects of his career: His political
social background, especially his educational activities as well as his
involvement in the affairs of the Methodist Church in Zimbabwe; the reasons
that compelled him to become totally involved in politics even though he knew
that he had only been chosen as a compromise leader who was supposed to have
stepped down after the referendum; his role within his party and especially his
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relations with the people who helped him to cling on topolitical power during
that time.
The study will also investigate why and how he participated in the Internal
Settlement between 1977 and 1978. It is of utmost importance to clarify why
he was part ofthe settlement; was it to retain the status quo, or was it to bring
change from within? Was it a calculated strategic move or bad judgement? An
analysis of his role in this regard is important to shed more light on the question
whether he was a liberator or a puppet.
The study will also focus on the role played by himduring the Lancaster House
Conference negotiations. It is necessary to establish whether Muzorewa was
a skilful negotiator or whether he was simply being manipulated by the British
team into accepting the Carrington proposals.
Lastly, the study will analyse the reasons why Bishop Abel Muzorewa lost the
1980 elections, such a short period of time after his resounding victory in the
1979 elections. Did he lose the 1980 elections because he failed to deliver the
goods during his term of office as prime minister? Did he lose the elections
because people regarded him as a rubber stamp prime minister or just a puppet?
Why did he lose the elections with all the necessary machinery at his disposal
which should have enabled him to win in 1980?
The writing of this mini-dissertation required the use ofa variety of sources.
Mostly secondary sources have been used. These include books, journals,
newspapers and research bulletins. Some useful published documents were also
consulted. The books and articles used are of varying academic quality and
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adopt different approaches. These works can be classified into the following
categories:
The first group ofauthors can be identified as pro-Muzorewa. An example is
M. Tamarkin's book The Making of Zimbabwe: Decolonization in Regional
and International Politics. Authors who are also in this category are M.
Meredith, The Past isAnother Country: Rhodesia 1890-1979, L.A. Sobel,
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 1971-1977, P.L. Moorcraft, A short thousand years:
The End of Rhodesia's Rebellion and N,E. Thomas, Bishop Abel Tendekai
Muzorewa: Rise up and walk: An Autobiography has attempted to justify
his involvement, not only the politics of Rhodesia but also, the internal
conflicting dynamics which were present within the nationalist leaders.
Asecond group can beclassified as pro-Smith-Muzorewa and their cause. This
group of authors tend to approach the issue of independence from a more
"conservative" view-point. They show their sympathy with the role played by
both Smith and Muzorewa since the days of Smith-Home proposals in 1972
throughout the whole process up to the 1980 elections. However, they are far
less biased in their evaluation and criticism of Muzorewa's role and the many
factors whichhave played a role in determining his achievements and failures.
Agood example is 1. Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster
House Conference onRhodesia ~1979. Authors who are also in this category
are M. Charlton, The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the
Independence ofRhodesia and H. Wiseman and A.M. Taylor, From Rhodesia
to Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transition.
A third and an influential group of authors can be identified as anti-Smith-
Muzorewa. They tend to approach the role of Bishop Abel Muzorewa in the
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independence struggle in Zimbabwe from a radically anti-Muzorewa and pro-
Mugabe point ofview. Examples of the authors are P. Gifford and W.M. Roger
Louis, Decolonization and African Independence: TheTransfers of Power
1960 to 1980, Martin and Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The
Chimurenga War, and Andre" Astrow, Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost
Its Way.
These authors do not spare Muzorewa or Ian Smithand their parties when they
lambast and castigate them for trying to delay the liberation ofZimbabwe. In
fact they tend to cast the blame for the ills ofRhodesia on Smith and the Smith-
Muzorewa alliance.
Research for this mini-dissertation was done at the following institutions:
Africa Institute in Pretoria.
Johannesburg State Library.
Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit.
University of South Africa.
University of theWitwatersrand.
The research focused mainly on secondary sources. Very little archival material
was found. The rNCH system was used to consultnewspaper reports on this
period. Rhodesian press reports as well as a variety of published documents
were consulted in the Unisa library. This information together with the various
points of view on the role of Bishop Muzorewa gives a solid foundation from
which this leader's role can be interpreted.
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This study will be divided into 7 chapters including the introduction (chapter I)
and conclusion (chapter 7). In chapter 2 a brief introduction and background
information is given about Bishop Abel Muzorewa as a teacher, an evangelist
as well as how and when he brought himself into conflict with Ian Smith regime
in 1971.
Chapter 3 deals with the role that he played as a politician and as the leader of
the ANC and how he defeated the Smith- Home proposals. This chapter will
also analyse the role that he played during the Victoria Falls talks as well as the
Geneva Conference. In other words it will evaluate Muzorewa's role in three
crucial events in the politics of Rhodesia before 1977.
InChapter 4 an attempt is made to determine the extent to which Bishop Abel
Muzorewa assisted Ian Smith in the formation of the interim government
between 1977 to 1979. This chapter will focus on two major issues: The
reasons why he opted for the internal settlement instead of the armed struggle
like Mugabe andNkomo. Secondly, the focus will be on Abel Muzorewa and
the interim government. Here an analysis will be given ofthe reasons why this
intemal settlement failed to bring about a final peaceful settlement. The focus
will be on the role ofMuzorewa as well as an evaluation ofhis successes and/or
failures.
In Chapter 5 an analysis is made to dctennine the role played by Bishop
Muzorewa during the Lancaster House talks. This chapter will focus on the
objectives and aims of the major players who participated in the talks and the
reasons why Muzorewa was "sidelined" during the talks.
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Chapter 6 deals with Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the elections of 1980. It
focuses on the election campaign and issues - such as the intimidation by
Muzorewa's auxiliary army and its effect on the whole election process. The
main focus will be on the election and the reasons why Bishop Abel Muzorewa
lost in this elections.
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CHAPTER 2.
Bishop Abel Tendekai Muzorewa's background.
Abel Tendekai Muzorewa was born on April 4,1925, at the Old Umtali
Mission. I He was the eldest of nine children of a Shona peasant family in
eastern Rhodesia.' He was educated at a mission school. After having passed
a Std 5 certificate he taught at lower primary school as an untrained teacher at
Chitimbe school in the Mrewa District from January, 1944 to December, 1945.
During the next two school years, he taught at the ZW1ga school in the same
district. At that time, in addition to school responsibilities, he beganto preach
asa local preacher in their church.
Towards the end of 1947, he became convinced that he would not do anything
big with his life with a meagre teacher's salary of $4.20 per month. But to
change occupations, however, was painful to him because he had grown to love
teaching. 3
Meredith says it took him eight years to make up his mind to decide whether to
work for the church or become a farmer like his father, however, from his
childhood he showed an early inclination towards religion.'
After leaving teaching, Abel Muzorewa was appointed as lay evangelist to the
Nyadiri East Circuit in the Mtoko District. Here he worked under the
supervision of Reverend Jonah Chitombo, who was the minister in charge of the
wider circuit. After working for several months as a lay Evangelist, he decided
to become a minister while he was working in the Nyadiri East Circuit. He was
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ordained as a minister ofthe United Methodist Church (UMC) at the Hartzell
Theological Seminary in 1953.5 The Christian leaders there recommended him
for theological studies. During his years as a village pastor (1955-1958), his
country was experiencing an awakening ofAfrican nationalism."
From 1958 onwards he studied religion, philosophy and Adolescent Psychology
at the Central Methodist College (CMC) in Fayette (Missouri, USA) and at
Scarrit College, Nashville (Tennessee) and he returned to Rhodesia in 1963.7
His church activities became known after the deportation of Bishop Ralph
Dodge. It was this incident which led him into contact with white officials of
the government in Salisbury. 8
He was appointed a Bishop of the UMC in Rhodesia on August 28, 1969,
replacing Bishop Dodge who retired from the church services. He made history
by being the first black member of his church to receive such adistinction."
Between 1969 and 1971 Bishop Abel Muzorewa became involved along with
leaders of otherdenominations in issues which brought them into conflict with
Ian Smith's regime. His baptism in political involvement as a church leader took
place in 1969 as Protestant andCatholic church leaders united to reject the new
constitutional proposals of the Smith regime. 10
The activities ofMuzorewa and the UMC in Zimbabwe inevitably attracted the
attention of the Smith regime. His growing criticism of racial discrimination,
and his opposition, along with other church leaders to the 1969 Land Tenure
Act, which directly affected thechurch activities by controlling the rights of one
race in the area ofanother, earned him a file at police headquarters. II
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But despite the protests, Hutson states that Smith went ahead with the
preparation of Rhodesia's new constitution which was submitted toa referendum
on20 June 1969. Nearly 75% voted for the new constitution and in the same
referendum for republican status. 12
Those who cast their votes, however, formed only less than 5%ofthe total adult
population. Bishop Muzorewa saw the proposals as the implementation of
apartheid such as found in South Africa."
According to Meredith, in 1970, two years after Muzorewa became a bishop,
he declared: lilt is our duty to serve people even at the risk of breaking laws.?"
The Smith regime, however, retaliated to his declaration by banning him from
entering the Tribal Trust Land, where three - quarters ofhis church followers
lived. He, however, protested that the ban would cripple his church work. IS
In 1970, the churches representatives including Bishop Muzorewa confronted
Ian Smith on 04June 1970 in his office. N.E. Thomas states that it was at that
meeting that Muzorewa came face to face with Smith for the first time.
Although this meeting led to the introduction of amendments to the Land Tenure
Act to exempt the churches from registration or from the necessity of applying
for the permits to enable them to continue their workonmission lands.16
But his banning order remained valid because the regime considered him a
threat." According to Meredith some Smith government officials considered
him a threat apparently because the UMC was more of apolitical force than a
religious organization. II
10
Bishop Muzorewa's growing criticism ofdiscriminatory laws brought him into
the world of politics at that time. Despite the restrictions, he, however,
continued to campaign from the pulpit, because he viewed his work more as a
Christian crusade than a political one."
N.E. Thomas states that Muzorewa reached a national audience both black and
white when he addressed the nation before his departure from Rhodesia to the
United States of America (USA) to attend a special session of the General
Conference (Gf') ofhis church as well as to receive an honorary doctorate. He
was perhaps angered because only 2% ofthe total population couId vote in the
coming elections of 1971 and that placed a heavy responsibility to the voteless
masses. It was during this gathering that Muzorewa expressed his view that
freedom was needed byall the people, black, white, coloured and Asian. This
was a clear indication that even the Rhodesian Front Party (RFP) was not free
yet, for it feared the loss of white privilege after majority rule is in place."
Although suchwords seemed mild, for Bishop Abel Tendekai Muzorewa they
marked his entry on to a national, rather than denominational stage. It was,
however, for the first time Muzorewa addressed concerns which were political
rather than religious."
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CHAPTER 3.
Bishop Muzorewa and the African National Council (ANC) 1971 - 1976.
3.1. Introduction.
According to Meredith it was the Smith - Home agreement of 1971 which led
the black nationalists to think of forming a movement with afigure - head whose
non-partisan past would win an undivided following among the black
population. At first, a man like Bishop Muzorewa wasan unlikely symbol of
African resistance because he had no political experience and seemed destined
to be overwhelmed in the treacherous world of Rhodesian politics. 1
Bishop Muzorewa had not been involved directly in nationalist politics and
possibly he would not provoke an immediate banning order. He, however,
appeared at that time to be a good compromise choice to lead a united
movement againstthe 1971 Smith - Home proposals. It was perhaps primarily
for this reasonthat he was chosen as President of the African National Council
(ANC).2
Wilfred Burchett argues that Muzorewa also accepted this invitation as the
result of Britain's soft handling of the Smith regime which eventually brought
about the opposite results to those intended.' The Heath government in Britain,
following in the footsteps of the Labour Party, had indeed finally come to terms
with the Rhodesian Government. According to the 1971 settlement proposals
reached between Smith and Britain, majority rule could be safely projected well
into the 21 st century and might even take over 100 years. This was an offer by
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Britain that the RFP could not refuse. However, the successful outcome of the
agreement depended onthe fifth of theso-called fiveprinciples laid down by the
Tory government in 1964 that the basis for independence was acceptable to the
people of Rhodesia as a whole.4
Wilfred Burchett says Muzorewa, as a result, accepted the invitation to head the
ANC which was to become a vehicle through whichZimbabwe African People's
Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) could maintain
contacts within Zimbabwe.S
In this chapter, attention will be given to the formation of the ANC, the reasons
why Muzorewa was chosen to head this movement, the objectives of the
African National Council at that time and their rejection of the Smith-Home
proposals.
3.2. Bishop Muzorewa and Smith-Home proposals.
In 1971 Africans in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia were totally convinced that the
proposals before the country were a betrayal of their own aspirations."
Sylvester argues that the proposals did not accord them dignity, justice, or fair
opportunities, parity of recognition which was as important to them as parity of
representation.' They, however, wanted to expose this betrayal and frustrate it,
yet there was no organised political activity amongst them at that time.
There was no political party to act as a vehicle of their struggle. The old
nationalist leaders were largely in prisons and detention camps. It was then that
the four former members of (ZANU) and (ZAPU) executives who had presented
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a joint declaration to Sir Alec - Douglas - Home, decided to form a new unity
movement to fight the agreement proposals.'
They therefore created anumbrella movement which was an internal surrogate
for ZANU and ZAPU to lobby the Pearce Commission against Smith's 1969
Constitution." The organization was named the African National Council
(ANC), and this name was carefully chosen because the initials ANC had
applied to the old African National Congress (ANC), banned in 1959, in which
the whole nationalist movement had been united. 10 This early unity effort was
noteworthy for putting Bishop Muzorewa at the head ofthe delegation and into
the political limelight for the first time.II
Despite his weakness, especially as a public speaker, they requested him to head
the new movement. His opposition to the settlement found ready support from
the majority of the Africans," apparently because chiefs and headmen who were
government paid elites unanimously in 1964 backed the idea ofindependence
under the 1961 constitution." There was no doubt thatthe majority of Africans
supported Muzorewa as itwas for the first time that they had been given a voice
in the affairs andfuture oftheir country."
Bishop Muzorewa was one of the representatives of the European Christian
Churches in Rhodesia. He, however, surfaced as the only representative of the
Zimbabwean internal interests during the commission in 1971 known as Pearce
Commission.
He was sometimes elected in this positionperhaps because he was a respected
African representative inside the country. He also became a well accepted
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chairperson of the ANC to the masses because of his lack of affiliation with
either ZANU and ZAPU atthat time.IS His non-violent creed and non-partisan
background made him the respectable compromise leader, the nationalists were
seeking in orderto avoid the banning of the ANC before it fulfils its mandate.16
Bishop Muzorewa was also particularly acceptable to the white community
simply because he had never, in any way, been associated with terrorism. 17 His
high standing in the Methodist Church made him acceptable to the British as
well. His political virginity made him at least tolerable to Ian Smith and his
religious base made him a favourite surrogate for ZANU.18 The RFP, for its
part, also tolerated him and the ANC perhaps because of the ANC's declared
opposition to violence as a means to achieve its ends." In actual fact, Bishop
Muzorewa had never been in serious trouble with the Smith authorities. He
was, however, not a military leader and could not be involved in directing
military activities."
Most significantly, his base of popularity with the African masses inside
Rhodesia continually broadened from 1972 - 1977. However, Bishop
Muzorewa was only expected to serve as a "transitional figure," and then
withdraw. 21 It was alleged that Abel Bishop Muzorewa was designated by
Joshua Nkomo at the time under maximum security detention in order to
organise a united campaign to reject the settlement proposals."
According to Martin and Johnson, Muzorewa had also told the African leaders
that the ANC indeed had been formed by Joshua Nkomo." His critics were
from the outsetconcerned about his lack ofpolitical acumen which they feared
could be exploited by the white minority regime." A.K.H. Weinrich states that
17
Muzorewa was a leader from the beginning with no policy direction, who was
obviously weak, lacked the courage ofhis convictions and was clearly not a true
leader."
The main objective ofthe formation of the ANC in 1971, was three fold: firstly
it was formed to call on the people to realize the essential power ofunity and to
move on as one people for the sake of achieving the ultimate goal of freedom.
Secondly, the ANC was formed in order to explain, advise and expose the
dangerous implications if the proposals were accepted. Thirdly, it was formed
to raise funds for the promotion of the organization.26
Muzorewa's main aim as a leader of the new movement was to unite all the
people, black and white, and therefore to establish a new orientation to the
struggle in order to bring about majority rule. His immediate objective was,
however, to gaina solid victory in the TestofAcceptability ofthe Smith-Home
proposals. 27
For Muzorewa, this objective would only become a reality through the ANC,
which was the heir to the people's struggle since 1890 after the imposition of
alien rule. The ANC remained the sole voice and instrument ofthe African
masses of Zimbabwe and all the people ofgoodwill in their juststruggle for
national emancipation from the yoke of Ian Smith oppressive minority rule.28
The whole test was to be based upon the recognition of the Rhodesian 1969.
constitution. These proposals providedfor the system of African representation
on the basis of the aggregate of income tax assessed on both Europeans and
Africans, to be replaced by a system depending on the numbers of registered
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voters on the African Higher Roll."
The fact that Smith's regime had accepted the proposals was, as some people
argued, a measuring - stick pointing to their danger for Africans." In 1972 the
British government therefore proposed that a test be conducted so as to be
satisfied that any basis for independence was acceptable to the people of
Rhodesia as a whole." This action was necessitated by the fact that there were
three parties involved in the dispute i.e. the British government, the Rhodesian
regime and lastly, the African population ofRhodesia. The fact of the matter
was that from the outset the negotiations were conducted between the British
and the Rhodesian regime with the exclusion of the African masses who were
then expected to endorse an agreement in which they had not been involved at
all."
Sylvester argues thatIan Smith agreed to test the Africans whether they would
accept the 1969 constitution as a basis for independence, hoping he could direct
the negotiations to go his way." To him, the test of acceptability, however, at
that time appeared to be little more than a formality. Firstly he was confident
enough to boast that Rhodesia had the happiest Africans in the world, and
secondly, he did not believe that the black nationalists, after a seven years
vacuum of political activity, would be able to organise opposition on a national
scale quickly enough to affect the outcomeofthe test of acceptability."
His judgement was partly correct because during that time political activities in
.
Rhodesia had reached a new pitch, as the efforts of the Rhodesian regime and
the British government to reach a settlement appeared close to success. Most
whites were in favour of the proposals and in the eyes of the regime, African
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opinion seemed also to incline in their favour."
According to Hutson the regime held an indaba of all Rhodesian chiefs and
headmen at Domboshawa near Salisbury from 21 to 26 October 1964 and
obtained theirunanimous declaration in favour of independence under the 1961
constitution. These groups ofpeople hadbeen consulted because they were the
only African paid leaders whom the regime recognised and trusted." Tamarkin
also says the chiefs and headmen had been consulted because they operated
within the structure of white domination." But, even though these groups
endorsed this idea, the British government would not accept that the views of
the chiefs and headmen were representative ofthe African peoples."
Atthe time when the colonial secretary returned from Rhodesia there was also
a feeling in Britain that there was a hundred percent chance for the Smith -
Home proposals to be accepted. But, the long delay between the date of the
agreement and the arrival of the British Commission under Lord Pearce in
Rhodesia on 12 January 1972, gave the anti-settlement elements inside and
outside Rhodesia time to mount a vigorous "No campaign" ,39
Interms of the settlement only political parties represented in parliament would
be allowed time on radio and television. This was because the ANC was not
represented yet and it did not have the opportunity to use the mass media. A
condition was laid down specifically to curtail the ANC from campaigning
effectively and widely because television and especially radio reached all the
people from all walks of life. 40
Bishop Muzorewa campaigned vigorously and conducted a nationwide tour in
20
order to advise and inform the rural Africans to reject the proposals which,
according to him were a constitutional rape of the African by both the
Rhodesian regime and the British government. He made a call on the British
government to convene a constitutional conference with the full African
representation."
During his campaign he also called on all Africans and their allies, namely the
Asians, Coloureds, white Liberals and Christians to reject the terms, which he
called a vicious and subtle device for the recognition of the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the British government. 42
The ANC was successful in the mustering ofwidespread support because it
managed to mobilize the majority of the African population to say "No" to
minority rule." This 'no' campaign shattered Ian Smith's ideal because Africans
rejected his so-called better terms which according to him would benefit them
all at a later stage.44
N.E. Thomas states that, however, the campaign as a whole could not be
considered free and fair apparently because the Smith- regime made it difficult
for them to have meetings accepted as normal political activity, simply because
the ANC was not yet a registered party at that stage." Moreover, even though
the ANC at that time pretended to believe in a non-violent, peaceful as well as
an orderly, but permanent and continuing struggle for the establishment of a
constitutional government."
This could be true because the Smith regime had tried several times, to sabotage
the campaign byarresting people who sympathized with the African cause. The
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white paper did not reflect a single suggestion made by African leaders." This
viewpoint was supported by Peter - Joyce who stated that the majority of
Africans were totally convinced that the Rhodesian Front (RF) regime was from
the outset committed to white supremacy in Rhodesia, arguing that the white
man had not sought the support of Africans in the pastand was therefore not
likely to do so in the future. ss
L.A. Sobel on the other hand says that Bishop Muzorewa rejected the proposals
because no settlement ofthe Rhodesian problem could be achieved without the
active participation by the African people, through nationalist leaders of their
own choice and not those favoured by the regime and imposed on them. S6
Miles Hudson summed it up in this way that even though the test of
acceptability was relegated to second place, it was not realized that, given a free
chance to express their views, the Africans would probably reject any agreement
in which they had not been involved. But again, even if this essential point had
been fully grasped, the fact was that there was no African political party, either
inside or outside Rhodesia which could have authoritatively represented all the
African people of that country. S7
In conclusion, the Lord Pearce Commission's findings were that the proposals
that the 1969 constitution form the basis for the independence were acceptable
to the Europeans, the Asians and the coloureds because they favoured the
chosen few who enjoyed privileges denied to the masses. The proposals,
however, were vigorously rejected by the majority of Africans with the
exception of very few tribal chiefs and headmen who were in the government
pay roll and voted infavour of it at the indaba held at Domboshawa from 21 to
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26 October 1964.58
In the Rhodesian Commentary of April vol. 7. No.9 of 1973, Robert Hayness
states that Muzorewa's rejection of the settlement leaves much to be desired.
He argues further and says the "No" to settlement was indeed a negative attitude
that sometimes robbed most of the Africans ofhope. The fact of the matter was
that the settlement terms as a whole neither gave theAfrican all they wanted nor
offered to the European all they wanted. However, in the final analysis, the
settlement did provide a platform for economic, social and political advantage
for the African; promise a more stable society, with improved two-way
discriminatory relations. 59
According to Hutson the true cause of the rejection of the Anglo/Rhodesian
proposals lay in the rapid changes which were then taking place inneighbouring
Mozambique andAngola between 1973 and 1974. As a result ofthe Portuguese
coup and its consequences of 1974, Bishop Muzorewa and his senior party
members felt that their own bargaining position was much stronger. Their
demand henceforth was not for a parity constitution butfor a no - domination
one and this seemed by no means extreme to them. Any sort ofcompromise
would render them liable to being labelled sell - outs byblack leaders outside
Rhodesia."
Kees Maxey states that the major response ofthe Africans during the Pearce
Commission's time in Rhodesia was peaceful, partly because the ANC was
obviously committed to non-violent opposition, a rational approach which was
largely favoured indeed by most Africans."
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From the beginning, however, Bishop Muzorewa saw his role as being purely
temporary and as such he was clearly reluctant to be.drawn into the depths of
politics. This is the reason why he was unable to give direction tothe process
simply because he was not a politician but a bishop. He was actually not
concerned with politics as such, but merely to see through an issue which he
considered a completely moral one. His main objective at the time was to see
the disbandment of the ANC as soon as the exercise was over, because it was
only a vehicle to mobilize only an opinion against the settlement proposals."
According to K. Ingham, at that time Bishop Muzorewa was seen by many as
a man ofgreat courage and sincerity even though it was a clear indication that
he was not schooled in the realities ofnationalist politics. As a bishop of UMC,
he was totally lacking in the ruthlessness which was becoming essential for an
effective leader." Tamarkin also argues that the ANC at that time was more
appealing to the masses, while Muzorewa himself, however, lacked regional and
international support. These are. some of the factors which undoubtedly
contributed to his position within the nationalist camp being seriously eroded.
Political acumenwas notamong his qualities."
As a result Bishop Muzorewa became little more. than an embarrassing
figurehead." His ineffectual leadership was heavily criticized within the ANC
ranks. He neither had a strong policy nor a strategy. He also had no clear plan
of action. His lack ofdecisive leadership created endless trouble for the ANC.
This began to affect the loyalty of restless elements in the organization who
were already critical of his performance as a whole. But, even though, his
colleagues within the leadership still needed his non-partisan reputation to
bridge the gap between the Zapu and Zanu groups inside the ANC and the
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mantle of respectability that his church credentials gave the party," the same
two factors which had prompted them to choose himas a leader in 1971.74
Finally, Legum says although the ANC was not yet a political party represented
inparliament, it was performing a political fimction at that time between 1971
and 1976, whereas in the interests of Africans at least they had broken the
political log-jam and given a focus for renewed political activity for Rhodesian
Africans whose morale had sunk to the lowest level. 7S
However, looking at the political conditions then in existence in Rhodesia of the
period between 1971 - 1976, Muzorewa played an important role in effectively
blocking the proposals, and had he gone back to the pulpit as head of the
Rhodesian's UMC atthat time, his contribution would have had a lasting effect.
Stepping down soon after his moment ofsuccess would have saved him from
becoming involved in what was later to follow."
3.3. Bishop Muzorewa and the Victoria Falls Conference, 25 August
1975.
3.3.1. Introduction.
The talks between Ian Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa had been initiated in
July 1973. During those preliminary talks, Muzorewa was in a far stronger
position than Ian Smith because of the majority no vote concerning the
AnglolRhodesian agreement. Miles Hudson argues that Smith failed to realize
that his objective should not have been topressurize Bishop Muzorewa, a weak
negotiator for that matter, into accepting comparatively minor concessions, but
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to construct an agreement which would be widely acceptable to Abel Bishop
Muzorewa's party."
However, failure to reach a settlement even with the moderate Bishop
Muzorewa and with the consequent prospect of an escalating violent struggle,
led to the regional patrons who in the past had played a secondary supportive
role, to step in in 1975.78 Tamarkin argues that without them the negotiations
would never had got off the ground." Their involvement immediately helped
to resolve the leadership of the ANC dispute by the acceptance of Bishop
Muzorewa as a chairperson of the VANe.80
This newly formed VANe was therefore ready to enter into immediate and
meaningful negotiations with the Smith regime on the steps to be taken to
achieve independence onthe basis of majority rule." However, this unity of the
rival nationalist factions was a marriage of inconvenience forced by an
overwhelming regional pressure. It did not reflect an urge for unity and held
little hope for a genuine pursuit of it.82 But it was only the two statements made
in December 1974 by the Rhodesian regime and the ANC, known as the Lusaka
agreement, that ushered ina new phase in the evolution of the Rhodesian crisis
which culminated inthe Victoria Falls bridge conferenceat the end of August
1975.83
From the beginning ofJune 1975, several so-called preliminary meetings were
held and demands and preconditions from both sides were made." On 20 July
1975, Bishop Abel Muzorewa gave Ian Smith three months to hold a
constitutional conference outside Rhodesia. Itwas perhapsBishop Muzorewa's
ultimatum which led to the meeting between Mark Chona, a representative of
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the Zambian government, Mr B.J. Vorster, a South African Prime Minister in
Pretoria on a plan to pave the way for the constitutional conference. The
outcome of the meeting was the Pretoria agreement, which led to the Victoria
Falls bridge conference on 25 August 1975.85
In this section attempts will be made to answer the question: what role did
Bishop Abel Muzorewa play at the Victoria Falls bridge conference?
3.3.2. Bishop Muzorewa's Delegation and the Victoria Falls Conference.
Since 1971, the Smith regime did not bother to recognise the African National
Council (ANe) as the authentic voice of the Rhodesian Africans," apparently
because the intention of the ANC leadership had to continue under the same
name even afterthe test ofacceptability asan organization rather than a political
party, whose main aim then would be the calling of a multiracial constitutional
conference, to negotiate ajust settlement ofRhodesia's problems."
However, in 1974, the same regime hadswung from flatly rejecting the ANC
as the authentic voice of the Africans to accepting it, perhaps due to the pressure
from Pretoria and Lusaka.88 This conference culminated on the agreement
between Ian Smith and Vorster in Pretoria. The ANC agreed to attend even
though itwas not directly aparty to the agreement, but in fact the details of the
agreement were well enough known by them before the conference.89
The conference opened on 25 August 1975. It was held in a railway
compartment halfway between Zambia and the Rhodesian border on the railway
bridge at Victoria Falls.90 Here Bishop Muzorewa, led the VANe group which
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included Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole, and he also declared that he
was determined to see the conference succeed and bear fruits. 91
Legum argues that Bishop Muzorewa's aim at the Victoria Falls talks was to
seek for, and try to achieve majority rule and end the Rhodesian Front
totalitarian and Fascism, which have haunted Africans for the last painful and
wasted eleven years." In his biography, Joshua Nkomo argues that the ANC
delegation indeed agreed that Bishop Abel Muzorewa would be the
spokesperson for the nationalist side even though he had no experience as a
negotiator. 93
It was during these talks that Bishop Muzorewa officially became a chairperson
ofa united organization because the contending nationalists ofZanu and Zapu
regarded him as neutral to their struggle." In his opening speech Bishop
Muzorewa urged the negotiators on bothsides to rise above personal and selfish
ambitions, and said the time was ripe for the people of Rhodesia to enter a new
and positive relationship between black and white. He said the ANC was
determined to achieve a peaceful settlement but their willingness to negotiate
must not be misunderstood to be a sign of'weakness."
According to Hutson the purpose of the Victoria Falls Conference, however,
was nothing but only to give the parties the opportunities to publicly express
their genuine desire to negotiate an acceptable settlement. After that the
conference was supposed to adjourn to enable the parties to discuss proposals
for a settlement in committee or committees with Rhodesia. There after the
parties were supposed to have met again in formal conferences, anywhere
decided upon, in order to ratify the committee proposals which would have been
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agreed."
Martin and Johnson convincingly argue that the conference was a farce from the
beginning. Bishop Muzorewa, the leader of the UANC, was not equipped
during this meeting to deal with Ian Smith, and the Rhodesian delegation had to
lend him a copy of the Pretoria agreement because thenationalist delegation had
neglected to send one to the meeting in Pretoria."
During the discussion, however, Bishop Muzorewa indicated that they would
be prepared to deliberate in Rhodesia, provided their representatives be granted
immunity. But this reasonable condition was not accepted by the Smith regime,
even though there was a danger for the nationalists being arrested inside the
country. Tamarkin argues that this was Ian Smith's tactics to stall the
negotiations before they reached a substantive stage, and therefore he adamantly
refused to grant them immunity.98
Meredith says again Bishop Muzorewa demanded black majority rule, but Ian
Smith rejected it as a precondition which prejudiced future talks. He also
demanded an amnesty, but again Ian Smith refused. The morning session was
asa result of Ian Smith's intransigence adjourned before lunch toallow Vorster
and Kaunda to try and resolve the disagreement. The afternoon session,
however, lasted for five hours, because Ian Smith adamantly refused immunity
for the exiled ANC members; and Bishop Muzorewa too equally adamantly
refused to agree to hold committee talks without it. Both Vorster of South
Africa and Kaunda of Zambia cajoled and warned of the consequences of
failure."
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Despite the presence of both these statesmen, at midnight, the meeting broke
down. Ian Smith seemed positively elated by the prospect ofthe failure.100
However, Victoria Falls was a dramatic venue, but the conference failed
because there was a question of immunity and this point had not been covered
by the Pretoria agreement. 101
Hudson states that the meeting failed not because Ian Smith refused to grant
amnesty for council leaders who faced possible arrest in Rhodesia if they
returned to participate in talks there.!" But, because Ian Smith had certainly
never conceded the principle of Majority rule of which without that, the
prospect of agreement was therefore out ofthe question, the nationalists would
accept nothing else.""
Hutson, on the other hand, argues that the prospect of success at the Victoria
Falls may never have been great from the outset, but at least there had been
signs as the decision of the Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU) Liberation
Committee not to oppose Kaunda of Zambia consultations with Vorster had
shown, that there was some willingness among the black ruled states to see the
complexities of the Rhodesian problem and to accept South Africa's help in
finding a solution. 104
He further says that it was not surprising that the conference was a farce,
because the very reason for holding the conference on the Victoria Falls bridge
was to accommodate the ANC and make it possible for externally based
representatives to be present at the formal opening conference. It had been a
major point taken up during the Pretoria talks between BJ. Vorster, Ian Smith
and Mark Chona a representative of Kenneth Kaunda ofZambia, but the ANC
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unfortunately wasnot physically represented when that decision was taken. If
they were, however, represented surely they would have rejected it at all costs.
There could be therefore little doubt that the ANC were perhaps determined to
make the conference fail.!"
Both parties, however, blamed each other for the failure of the conference. But
this failure was somewhat surprising because the conditions for achieving a
peaceful ever settlement in Rhodesia at that historical juncture were not at all
perhaps unfavourable. But, however, within the ANC in particular, there was
considerable support for a peaceful settlement.f"
The Victoria Falls bridge conference was, in effect, the last time that the
nationalist movement presented an officially united negotiating front under the
chairmanship ofBishop Abel Muzorewa. It was, however, the first and at the
same time the last of its nature.'?' Utete states that this was because of the,
emergence of two organizations both laying claim to the name of African
National Council (ANC). These two were the more popular United African
National Council (UANC) ofBishop Abel Muzorewa andthe African National
Congress of Joshua Nkomo (ANC).108
Tamarkin argues that the regional patronsattempt on 7 December 1974 to force
these parties to merge and negotiate with one voice had failed because of
ideological, ethnic and personal factors that divided them.l'" The militant
nationalist leaders believed that they possessed the keys to national salvation
and a merger with the moderate reformist ANC under the leadership of
Muzorewa would dilute their negotiatingstrategy. I 10
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Following the aborted Victoria Falls talks, the rivalry amongst the ANC
leadership intensified. All the leaders manoeuvred for political power. Joshua
Nkomo in particular pursued a different strategy whereby his plan was to
convene a congress which would elect him as leader of the United African
National Council (VANC). This action, however, led to his expulsion from the
UANe by Bishop Abel Muzorewa on II September 1975.11 1
When analysing how Muzorewa had handled the Victoria Falls talks one is left
with no doubt as to why Zanu and Zapu members decided to go their separate
ways.!" It was clear from Nkomo's comments that Muzorewa was indeed
unable to stand up to Ian Smith's arguments as a chairperson of the delegation
because he lacked political experience. Bishop Muzorewa failed completely to
convince Ian Smith because he had no experience as either a negotiator or
politician. Hudson says Muzorewa could have obtained more concessions for
the then exiled leaders, ifhe was not a weak and incompetent negotiatorI 13
Bishop Muzorewa failed to convince Ian Smith perhaps because the VANe at
that time only represented essentially the aspirations of the moderate African
nationalist elite. This was likely because since 1971, Muzorewa was committed
to a non-violent struggle and hence he had to pay an ideological and political
price for his preference. However, Muzorewa was prepared to compromise and
accommodate white interests and anxieties within the context of a peaceful and
as well as Evolutionary progress to majority rule. 114
Ironically, Bishop Muzorewa had persisted in his moderate choice despite
harassment, persecution and provocation by the Smithregime; perhaps because
the UANC avoided to be banned. Failure to reach an agreement with the
34
moderate Bishop Abel Muzorewa, however, brought about a situation in the
future when the white representatives had to negotiate their survival at Lancaster
House Conference in 1979 under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister
Bishop Abel Muzorewa.!"
Inconclusion, it is clear from the discussion above that Bishop Muzorewa was
a rather ineffectual leader or politician and therefore it came as no surprise when
he failed to bring on board Zapu and Zanu as a unified nationalist movement
called the United African National Council (UANC) as the Front line states
(FLS) Presidents so wished. The enforced unity, however, had failed to
eliminate the deep-rooted causes of disunity, which was a leadership struggle
amongst the Zimbabweans. Moreover, this happened after the FLS Presidents
had enlisted the support ofthe Organization ofAfrican Unity (GAU) Liberation
Committee.!"
In its January 1975 meeting in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, the GAU Liberation
Committee recognised the ANC as Rhodesia's only liberation movement;
freezing the recognition ofZanuand Zapu. The turning ofthe VANe into the
sole channel for the GAU support to the Rhodesian nationalists was apparently
expected to enhance its position as an effective unified and very strong
movement. 117
3.4. Bishop Muzorewa and the Geneva Conference, 28 October 1976.
3.4.1. Introduction.
After the failure of the Victoria Falls talks, the struggle for leadership of the
3S
VANC between Joshua Nkomo and Bishop Muzorewa continued unabated. It
was during this time that Muzorewa faced the severest challenge to his
leadership since 1972. In spite of this struggle, Muzorewa continued to bid for
unity with Joshua Nkomo soon after the final collapse of their talks because he
did not believe that there was such a thing as an internal and anexternal ANC
wing in Rhodesia. But unfortunately, this offer of friendship byMuzorewa was
totally rejected by Nkomo in July 1976 as ithad been rejected inMarch 1976. 118
This was a clear indication that the Patriotic Front (PF) leaders as they were
now called, Nkomo and Mugabe rejected Muzorewa's role asa chairperson of
the VANC because they saw him as an internal representative for Zanu and
Zapu only. They therefore wanted him to withdraw as the chairperson of the
VANC in favour of the externally established candidate probably, Joshua
Nkomo or Robert Mugabe.!"
This split within the VANC, undermined the great prestige which Muzorewa
had obtained through his successful campaign against the AngIolRhodesian
proposals and meant that unless he could force himself to the centre of the stage,
he would be unlikely to finish up as leader ofa United Zimbabwe.!"
However, Muzorewa insisted that he was the only rightful leader of the
movement as head ofthe ANC. But, since the collapse of the talks in Victoria
Falls, he had been deliberately prevented from visiting the guerrillas camps in
Mozambique and Tanzania so that his claim to the leadership could be rejected
also by the guerrillas as well. 121
The endless infighting between the two leaders continued, and this led to the
36
formation of yet another organization, the Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC)
by Bishop Abel Muzorewa inJuly 1975. This council was the external wing of
the ANC which in theory still existed as an Umbrella organization comprising
both Zanu and Zapu. The ZLC was, however, to be used as a passage through
which Muzorewa could have access to the guerrilla camps.!"
In October 1, 1976, after the announcement and commitment to majority rule by
Ian Smith, Kenneth Kaunda urged both Joshua Nkomo and Bishop Muzorewa
to form a political alliance. But Muzorewa by then had already changed his
mind, and therefore resisted Nkomo's overtures for such an alliance, realising
that he still commanded substantial support within Zimbabwe. Andre Astrow
argues that Bishop Muzorewa seemed to have had little to gain by uniting with
a leader who had just discredited himself and had therefore relatively little
support inside the country. Bishop Abel Muzorewa felt perhaps that there were
more disadvantages than advantages to begained by allying himself with Joshua
NImmo, a man ora leader who was only welcomed by a mere 1, 500 supporters
when he came back home.!"
3.4.2. Bishop Muzorewa and the Geneva Conference, 28 October 1976.
L.A. Sobel states that Britain as a colonial power formally announced the
Geneva Conference participants on the 12 October 1976.124 The African's
position at the conference was much more complicated. There were three rival
groups, the Patriotic Front (PF), Abel Bishop Muzorewa's ANC and Sithole's
Zanu, each pursuing its own tactics about how to achieve their agreed
objective. 125
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All African leaders refused to accept Kissinger's proposals as a basis for
negotiations but, however, they agreed to attend the conference apparently
because they feared that their refusal might provoke the West countries into
showing greater sympathy for Ian Smith's cause.!" This was, however, after the
ANC that had been originally formed as an umbrella organization for Zapu and
Zanu became irrelevant in 1976 when its main component parts resumed their
independent existence.!"
Bishop Abel Muzorewa led a delegation of twenty - one members. The
conference on Rhodesia's majority rule held its opening session on the 28
October 1976. From the outset, Bishop Muzorewa was full of confidence that
the nationalists were going to get a settlement!"
Andre Astrow says the main aim of Britain was to set up a transitional
government, using Ian Smith's public commitment to majority rule within two
years as a basis for further negotiations. When Britain invited them, all the
political leaders of the nationalist movement were determined to attend, perhaps
because the conference on the other hand was to be chaired by the British
Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Mr Ivor Richard.!"
At the opening session of the Conference, Ian Smith stated that he came to
discuss the implementation of the Anglo/American proposals, while the
nationalists though not united in the sense ofthe word, arrived at the conference
united in the total rejection of the Kissinger proposals.!" Thus, even Bishop
Muzorewa, who had an interest in the success of the conference and in a
political rather than military solution, had to join nationalist leaders in rejecting
the proposals. 131 In their views, the objectofthe conference was to arrange the
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transfer of power to a black government on their own terms. Beyond that,
though, they differed about the tactics to be employed. 132
Meredith argues that the radical fervour brought to Geneva by Robert Mugabe's
delegation pulled others along in its wake. Bishop Muzorewa was therefore
influenced to some extent by Mugabe's uncompromising militancy.!" He goes
further to say that when the conference resumed the next morning, Bishop
Muzorewa, in a mood of acrimony, making the first speech, set the tone. "We
have come here only to take ourcountry, he said." He accused the Smith regime
of torture, secret hangings and the genocide. He also criticised the British
government forfailing to assume its role asacolonial power, demanding a one
man one vote constitution and independence within twelve months. 134
During the informal session on 2 November 1976, Bishop Muzorewa had
demanded independence by the end of 1977, while the Smith delegation had
insisted upon the independence within two years. It was during this session that
Bishop Muzorewa had also called for the election of an interim government on
a one man one vote basis and for the representation of political parties in the
government on the basis of their electoral strength, knowing fully that he
commands majority of Africans inside the country more than any other
nationalist leaders. 135
It was perhaps through the support shown by the Africans during that time;
which compelled Bishop Muzorewa to pursue the holding of an election to
choose a black Prime Minister and a ministerial representation proportional to
the votes cast for each party. With the largest popular supports; Bishop
Muzorewa would stand to become the democratically elected black Prime
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Minister. P.L. Moorcraft says Bishop Muzorewa was ina buoyant mood and
confidently declared. "We have come to the conference fully aware of our
strength. The ANC is not here in a spirit ofgive and take. We have come here
only to take - to take our country. ,,136
Bishop Muzorewa also favoured a nine to twelve months transitional period for
the interim government. He also wanted the composition of the interim
government to be determined by the voters. But, these suggestions were not
acceptable to the Smith regime and the Patriotic Front (PF) leaders. The PF
leaders in particular were yet unsure of their domestic constituency and
therefore wanted control before elections.l"
Bishop Muzorewa also wanted a BritishCommissioner, but with greater powers
to preside over a national security council (NSC), whichwould becharged with
the task of transforming the guerrillas forces into a national army. The PF
leaders, however, were in favour of it, but rejected the idea of elections;
claiming that they could not be held freely while Ian Smith was still in power.
The Rhodesian Front Party (RFP) declined to take part in the discussions
insisting; as before; that the purpose of the conference was simply to approve
the Kissinger's agreement and decide the membership ofthe council of state.138
According to Meredith Bishop Muzorewa was not willing to see the conference
break down over a preliminary issue.!" though he had no policy, no ideology
and no program of actions, 140 whereas the PF leaders on the other hand had
arrived convinced that the conference would not succeed and their demands
could cause its failure."! On 4 December 1976, Bishop Muzorewa condemned
the PF leaders for opposing the elections for the interim Rhodesian government.
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He also accused them for creating an anti-democratic front along with the white
minority regime delegation. On 5 December 1976, he called upon Rhodesian
whites tojoin the ANC, awelllmown moderate and protector ofwhites interests
party.'?
L.A. Sobel says Muzorewa's call was the first appeal for general white
participation with ablack faction. He also argues that Ian Smith left the Geneva
Conference-room discredited because he had failed to get others around the
table who supported the Kissinger's proposals, to his surprise even leaders like
Joshua Nkomo and Bishop Muzorewa who were known to be moderates, did
not compromise. 143
Meredith states that it was obvious that no benefit could be gained from
prolonging the conference any longer, As a result, on 14 December 1976,
. Richard who chaired the conference formally adjourned the conference until
January 1977, but it was never to resume again on the 17th as itwas agreed. 144
According to Burchett, from thebeginning to the adjournment of the conference,
the exact contents of the joint Anglo/American proposals and the Kissinger
proposals were never disclosed.l'"
However, the conference as a whole achieved none of itsstated aims. Astrow
argues that themain aim was to set up a transitional government, using Smith's
public commitment to majority rule within two years as a basis for
negotiations.!" According to Tamarkin their problem, however, was how to
bridge the gap between the contending parties, the nationalists and the
Rhodesian regime which by then seemed increasingly unbridgeable. 147
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Inconclusion, according to Godfrey Morrison in Africa confidential, vol. 17
of 1976, the Geneva Conference's failure to reach its goal by the target date of
20 December 1977 was not seen as a step in the right direction. However, it
would be a great mistake to write off the Geneva affair asa waste of time and
effort.'" Firstly, it inadvertently succeededin bringing together Zanu and Zapu
members into a loose alliance called the PF before the conference. The alliance
realistically lasted up to and including the Lancaster House talks!" Secondly,
Burchett says the conference provideda forum for consolidation among the real
national liberation militants; it also brought about the exposure of those who
believed it was possible to talk their way into independence and the top power
positions. Thirdly, it projected the PF into the unrivaled fIrst place and provided
a tribune for it to make its aims known to the outside world. ISO
Utete says the main criticism of the Kissinger plan was the substance of power
which would remain in the hands of the whites. It thus did not come as much
of a surprise when all the nationalist delegations at the Geneva Conference
including Bishop Abel Muzorewa rejected the Kissinger proposals in all their
essentials. 151
Whereas P.L. Moorcraft argues that the conference was failing because the
Blacks/Nationalists could not agree amongst themselves to form a United front
to compel Ian Smith to shift from his firm stand that the Kissinger proposals
were non-negotiable. But in the final analysis, Ian Smith might just possibly
have stuck to the Kissinger plan out of a sense of personal commitment, or, he
might have hoped that this approach would inevitably inspire African opposition
and division and that the blame for the conference failure would therefore be on
their hands.!"
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Utete says subsequent British efforts to resuscitate the talks on the basis of the
revised proposals collapsed when on 24 January 1977, Ian Smith declared his
own opposition to both the newBritishproposals and to any further negotiations
involving the PF delegation. 153
Andre Astrow on the other hand believes that the formation of the PF had an
extremely important development on or after the failure ofthe conference as it
polarized the divisions within thenationalist movement between those who were
eventually to gain control over the military wings of the movement and those
who went to sign the internal agreementon the 3 March 1978. 154
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Chapter 4.
Bishop Muzorewa and the internal settlement, 1977-1979.
4.1. Introduction.
Tamarkin writes that the Rhodesian's regime alternative to the Ivor Richard-plan
was not a return to white political domination, but rather a settlement on the
basis ofthe Kissinger plan with representatives of moderate African opinion like
Bishop Abel Muzorewa. This was a variant of the internal settlement with
which the regime had toyed in the past. The alternative, however, was that Ian
Smith and Bishop Muzorewa come together and try to solve the country's
problems. 1
It was undoubtedly partly as a result of the failure of Richard initiative, that gave
way in November 1977, to the negotiations between Ian Smith and Bishop Abel
Muzorewa. Thefailure ofthe Anglo/American initiative particularly allowed
and encouraged both of them at last to launch their favoured internal option,
namely the internal settlement.2
This chapter attempts to determine the extent to which Bishop Abel Muzorewa
helped Ian Smith in the formation of the interim government and the reasons
why he opted for it. It will also look into his role in the interim government.
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4.1.1. Reasons Why Bishop Abel Muzorewa Opted for the Internal
Settlement With Ian Smith.
According to Meredith, the failure of the Geneva Conference was critical for
Bishop Muzorewa because the British government was seen paying too much
attention to the Patriotic Front (PF). He was again outraged at the British
scheme to conduct ceasefire talks in Malta without his participation.' However,
Britain had intended the Malta talks to include all the Rhodesian parties who
had been represented in Geneva and not only the Patriotic Front leaders." This
Anglo/American initiative had been reactivated by the positive prospect of an
internal settlement between Bishop Muzorewa and Ian Smith.'
When Britain invited Ian Smith to the Malta talks, he rejected this invitation
because of Britain's insistence in trying to appease the PFleaders with a lot of
compromises. This had convinced him that there was no chance ofbending the
Anglo/American terms tohis advantage." Dr Owen, however, invited only the
PF leaders for further talks in Malta in the middle of December 1977.7
Bishop Abel Muzorewa had been deliberately excluded from this talks
apparently because he was by then part ofthe Smith regime. This was clearly.
an indication that he was already condemned by the PF leaders along with the
other internal black leaders.' In Bishop Muzorewa's view, this was evidence of
a British plot to assist the return of JoshuaNImmo to Rhodesia and then impose
him as the future leader ofZimbabwelRhodesia.9
Tarnarkin argues that the Malta talks initiative was, however, conducted at least
to prevent the PF leaders from intensifying the war and at the same time slow
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the momentum towards an internal settlement. 10 At the Malta talks, the most
important result was that Dr Owen assured the PF leaders that the British
government would take no steps to recognise any newgovernment in Rhodesia
until a conference had been held involving all parties to the conflict. II
However, although the internal option was in the air from as early as in 1977
and despite thefact that Ian Smith's offer was much more attractive, the internal
negotiations began in earnest only towards the end of 1977. But to Bishop
Muzorewa, the conditions had to mature and the international effort had to be
consummated before the internal option couId be seriously emertained." Bishop
Muzorewa, having no guerrilla army to back him, knew after the Geneva
Conference that the internal settlement was his only option. But, he was,
however, also aware of the high price that such an option entailed."
It was obvious that by excluding Bishop Abel Muzorewa from that part of the
Anglo/American initiative, Britain finally propelled him towards acceptance of
Ian Smith's internal plan." He therefore decided to join because he found
himselfwelcorned by Ian Smith who was also undergrowing pressure in 1978
from the SouthAfrican government, who in turn wanted to prove that their idea
was indeed correct and feasible. IS But even though, Bishop Muzorewa stilI
insisted, however, that any deal would have to be on the basis ofone man one
vote. Furthermore, he demanded as a precondition to any formal talks that Ian
Smith make public commitment to majority rule. Because without it, he would
have been labelled as stooge, but with it, he could point a great victory. 16
According to PL. Moorcraft, it is alleged that Bishop Abel Muzorewa pointed
out that Rhodesia had to become ZimbabwelRhodesia via the internal route."
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Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who saw himself as the chiefspokesman for unity
since 1971, was ashostile to the PF in Geneva as Ian Smith was. He had been
also perhaps infuriated by the Organization ofAfrican Unity's (OAU) decision
in early July 1977 to throw its collective weight behind the PF, even so, he had
from the outset no intention of coming to a separate deal with Ian Smith while
the Anglo/American initiative offered him the prospect ofgaining power through
an internationally acceptable plan. But, still Ian Smith doubted whether Bishop
Muzorewa could be relied upon to open negotiations even if the
Anglo/American initiative eventually failed. IS
So, with the Front Line States (FLS) presidents having opted for the PF and with
Ian Smith having rejected Richard's proposals and hence negating any
possibility of a reconvention of the Geneva Conference, Bishop Muzorewa had
only one course ofaction, to discuss peace with Ian Smith. His main objective
for trying to conclude a deal with Smith was, however, motivated by his desire
to become the first Black Prime Minister ofZimbabwe. 19
P.L. Moorcraft argues that even thoughAbel Muzorewa welcomed the plan, he
foresaw dangerfor any black nationalist leader to deal directly with Ian Smith
to try and achieve an internal settlement.20 However, byAugust 1977, when Dr
Owen and Andrew Young toured Southern Africa with their proposals, Bishop
Muzorewa realized that there was no international salvation for him either,
because the Anglo/American team ignored his demand for a referendum to
decide who would negotiate on behalfof the African nationalists, and he saw the
transition arrangements also too giving a clear advantage to his rivals, the PF
leaders."
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Andre Astrow also states that it was through this fear thatat first Bishop Abel
Muzorewa seemingly took a more hard-line stand during most of 1977. During
that time, he, however, maintained that he would talk to Ian Smith only on
condition that he was prepared to completely surrender, immediately, and
unconditionally."
As time went on, Bishop Muzorewa realized that his position asthe president
of the ANC had vastly weakened because the guerrilla armies had rejected his
leadership as had the FLS presidents and the OAU Liberation Committee. He,
however, had little choice but to negotiate with Ian Smith, particularly, when in
late 1977, Ian Smith announced his intention to begin talks with moderate
nationalists, with a view to signing an internal settlement. 23
Andre Astrow argues that seemingly, Bishop Muzorewa might have decided to
negotiate an internal settlement because hefeared the guerrillas onslaught more
than Ian Smith's regime, and this perhaps forced him into agreeing to the terms
as put forward by the whites."
While Meredith says he opted to negotiate with them believing that he would
win either the referendum or an internationally supervised free and fair elections.
But obviously, the scrapping of some racial measures by Ian Smith's regime
indeed, had also a bearing on Bishop Muzorewa's acceptance ofjoining Ian
Smith internal settlement. He saw many opportunities ahead such as the
possibilities for the Africans to be appointed as either magistrates orofficers in
the police, the army and prison service as well as the banpreventing Africans
from drinking in white areas after 7 p.m. being lifted."
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4.1.2. Bishop Muzorewa and the internal settlement.
Andre Astrow says that for Bishop Abel Muzorewa, after having been sidelined
by the guerrillas, the Patriotic Front (PF) leaders, the Front Line States (FLS)
Presidents and the Organization of African Unity (DAU) Liberation Committee,
was in no position to reject the offer put before him by the Rhodesian Front
Party (RFP) under Ian Smith. Bishop Abel Muzorewa by then knew that in
order to get a slice of the national cake, he had to come to terms with Ian
Smith." However, according to G. Baumhogger, Ian Smith regime welcomed
him because of his tribal politics which were geared to divide the people of
Zimbabwe. 27
According to Meredith, the welfare of the whites was Smith's overriding
concern. He did not perceive at the time that, to make the internal settlement
plan work, the black leaders needed to win terms favourable enough for them
to be able to convince the black population that a real transfer ofpower was
taking place which merited their support. Instead Ian Smith, however, argued
that, as the whites had agreed to one man one vote, it was the turn of the
nationalists to make visible concessions."
Indeed, Bishop Muzorewa's response to Smith's stand was clear. 29 He,
however, at lastagreed to join Smith and work with him in the establishment of
the internal government. Meredith points out that some ofthe most notable
features of the agreement Bishop Muzorewa accepted included twenty eight
(28) seats in the legislative assembly reserved particularly for whites, which
were to be retained for ten years or two parliaments, which ever was the longer;
property rights would be protected; the security forces; the police and the
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independence of the judiciary would also be retained. All these provisions
would be also entrenched in the constitution and could be amended only by a
Bill receiving the support ofat least seventy eight (78) members. Although this
constitution hadbeen designed by both Ian Smith and Bishop Muzorewa, so to
speak, it leaves much to be desired. The United States of America (USA) and
Britain did not oppose the internal settlement as such."
Because of the attitudes displayed by both these countries, Bishop Muzorewa
therefore signed the internal settlement on 3 March 1978. He signed the
settlement simply because a liberationwar was not an end in itself, but a means
to the end of political liberation. Bishop Muzorewa as a man of God, abhorred
the philosophy that prolonged war. In his opinion war was to be resorted to as
a last resort, to be employed as a form of self-defence when all other means to
achieve justice have been tried in vain."
He was further encouraged bythe attitude ofthe SouthAfrican government who
was prepared to pour in money to help build up the Bishop's United African
National Council (VANC). He was also promised a substantial transport and
other support to help him win the pending elections of 1979.32
According to Gifford and Roger Louis, the advantage under the internal
agreement was appealing and attractive to Bishop Abel Muzorewa. To him the
elections to be held during April 1979, would for the first time in the history of
Rhodesia be of a democratic nature. The elections wouldbe based on universal
adult suffrage and this would result in a black Prime Minister. These two facts
indeed were historic events in themselves because monopoly white power would
no longer ever be possible."
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A further advantage as seen by Meredith was that Ian Smith had agreed that
after the election, white representatives would not be allowed to form a coalition
with black minority groups to thwart the right ofa majority party to take control
of the government. This stipulation precluded the possibility of an alliance
between the whites and Joshua Nkomo, which Bishop Muzorewa feared for so
long."
A third advantage under the internal agreement was that Bishop Abel Muzorewa
also won from Ian Smith an agreement that any guerrillas wanting to join the
security forces would be permitted to do sowithout pre-conditions. These were
some ofthe major concessions that Bishop Muzorewa had won from Ian Smith's
previous refusal to contemplate the idea."
Andre Astrowstates that Bishop Muzorewa was very happy about those little
concessions compared to what he in return had to offer the whites. Jubilantly
he also announced that racial discrimination had been scrapped in Rhodesia.
The whites tooka more sober view of the changes because white privilege had
been preserved. While there was a black majority in government, the
settlers/whites had managed to gain the necessary concessions from Bishop
Muzorewa to preserve a system based on financial privileges.36
During this period, Bishop Muzorewa did not fit well as the Prime Minister of
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, because many of the blacks who voted for him realized
that he was failing to effect visible changes in the new state called.
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. It was because of this failure to make striking social and
economic alterations thus rapidly eroded black support both for him and for the
internal settlement. His electoral win in April 1979 cannot be an undisputed
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indication of black support for the internal settlement, though itdid signify at
least substantial backing for him."
With these substantial backing from the electorate, Bishop Muzorewa, however,
failed to take a decision when Byron Hove, his nominee, was dismissed as a Co-
Minister of Law and Justice soon after his appointment. He did not have the
power or the courage to back up his own minister on the vital issue of reforms
in the police and the judiciary,"
However, in the final analysis, Bishop Muzorewa could be seen as an equal of
Ian Smith, because he had tried under the circumstances by achieving the
mechanics for the transfer of power from the minority regime to the black
majority. From that viewpoint, the blacks had achieved what nobody had ever
dreamed possible."
In the fmal analysis, the internal agreement signalled the death to white settler
political supremacy and a victory to the principle of the African majority rule.
Bishop Muzorewa also believed that Ian Smith signed away white minority rule
and set in motion a constitutional process at the end of which an African
dominated Parliament was elected and Bishop Muzorewa became the first black
Prime Minister."
Generally speaking, the transitional government was accepted by most of the
white electorate because itwas almost like a manna from heaven for them since
they had a lot to gain from the constitution itself while the same brought a lot of
frustration to the Africans as a whole."
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However, the signing ofan agreement inMarch 3, 1978 proved to be crucial to
others because this was the only event perhaps that has thrown offonce and for
all the yoke of colonialism." The election results of April 1979, also signified
the Bishop as a man who was credited with a power to unify the Rhodesian
divided masses because many of them probably rightly believed that he was
ambitious for his country rather than for himself. The outcome of the 1979
election results portray him at the time to many Africans as a man who had the
honesty to identify with their interests rather than his own. But, however,
Bishop Muzorewa lacked the manipulative skills of hisnationalist rivals, namely
Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. The irony was that he eventually found
himselfperhaps a nationalist leader with a large following and to his surprise a
very small organization during the 1980 British supervised elections."
Even though many Africans seemed to have voted for him, the majority saw the
constitution as rather a Bantustan constitution because there was no difference
between this constitution and those which were found in South Africa
Bantustans. All the Africans wanted a constitution which would be the product
of all the people, internal and extemalleaders together and there would be an
everlasting peace in the country.44
In conclusion, the common bound which have united Ian Smith and Bishop Abel
Muzorewa seemed to be the fear of the guerrillas of the PF leaders. Both Ian
Smith and Bishop Muzorewa had a vested interests in the successful outcome
of the internal settlement government and were, very much concerned about the
consequences of failure."
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4.2. Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the failure of the internal settlement.
Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who was the President of the United African National
Council (UANe), was formally sworn in as the first black Prime Minister of
ZimbabwelRhodesia by the new President Josia Gumende." PL. Moorcraft
argues that Bishop Muzorewa was not anxious to be seen being sworn in under
a regime's constitution which he rejected in 1972 on the basis that it is
illegitimate. However, even though he agreed, his oathof allegiance was to the
state of ZimbabwelRhodesia and not the Pre-Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UD!) constitution."
After being sworn in, Bishop Muzorewa found himself presiding over a cabinet
where all key portfolios were held by Ian Smith's colleagues. Parliament also
reflected a constitution whose blocking mechanisms included the adventitious
addition of a second chamber senate, empowered to entrench white power
indefinitely. The Rhodesian security forces (RSF), police and all other elements
inthe security structure remained in the white hands."
Despite his growing influence and increased power, Bishop Muzorewa
continued to show a singular lack of political Ieadership." This can be seet!
when he madesomany concessions by leaving the judiciary and police in white
hands. These concessions made the internal agreement less credible among the
African masses from the very beginning. This was moreso because the state
security structure was regarded by the Africans in general as a state killing
machine, hence their objection of it being in white hands.50
The internal settlement of March, 3, 1978 was rejected as a whole by the
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Africans because Ian Smith's UDI of 1965 had been part of the same plan.51
They also rejected it because Africans realized that by signing an agreement,
Bishop Abel Muzorewa had made an irrevocable blunder. Meredith argues that
it seems as if far more remarkable amongthe concessions made by him was the
agreement to allow whites a powerful political role in a coalition government for
the first five years ofmajority rule.52
The new government formed after the election was to be known as the
Government ofNational Unity (GNU) and any political party which gained five
(5) or more parliamentary seats in the election was entitled to representation in
the cabinet in proportion to the number ofseats itheld in the National Assembly
(NA). Therefore, as the whites were already guaranteed twenty eight (28) out
of hundred (100) seats, they were entitled to five cabinet posts."
Meredith goes on topoint out that, the most astonishing part ofthe constitution
was the decision to call the new state ZimbabwelRhodesia. For more than
twenty years the black nationalists had been united on little else but the name
Zimbabwe. 54 PL. Moorcraft states that this agreement makes perhaps
ZimbabwelRhodesia a sort of Bantustan and because the Africans in the
government of National Unity (GNU) must be assigned the role of
Matanzimas.S5
Just as importantly, Bishop Muzorewa was now associated with the unpopular
moves by the regime to fight the war. The ravages inflicted by the Rhodesian
security forces (RSF) and auxiliaries in the country side played an important part
inundermining rural support for the internal settlement. Moreover, the security
forces' repeated attacks on guerrillas and refugee camps in the FLS were
6S
responsible for the settlement leaders losing much of the support Bishop
Muzorewa had previously commanded.56
Under Bishop Muzorewa's command the national army also bombarded the
Zambian capital of Lusaka, engaged in well-documented massacres in the
Mozambican Camps, and offered gifts to the guerrillas who accepted amnesty.
Moreover, Bishop Muzorewa could have been triggered by the shooting down
oftwo Air Rhodesian passenger planes near Kariba Dam by Zimbabwe Peoples
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), retaliation, however, caused him support that
politics so much demand. 57
Moreover, again while proclaiming concern for the peasants in protected
hamlets, Bishop Muzorewa continued the old Rhodesian practice of limiting
their food supplies to bare subsistence so there would be no surplus to pass on
to the guerrillas. He therefore soon lost his initial popularity, arguably because
hedid not use his position as Prime Minister to distance himself from Ian Smith
and the old practices ofRhodesia. S8
Meredith argues that the bishop's critics within the UANe also accused him of
inept and indecisive leadership. They blamed him for conceding too much
power to the whites under the internal settlement agreement, for standing by
impotently while the white run establishment disposed of Mr Byron Hove, and
for failing to remove all the Rhodesian's race laws from the statute books.
Many, however, wanted Bishop Muzorewa to pull out before the party became
toodeeply discredited. When the Bishop refused, several officials of his party
deserted.59
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There is no doubt that Bishop Abel Muzorewa had failed completely even to
protect Mr Byron Hove, because the constitution's shortcomings perhaps
reflected the political facts of life in ZimbabwelRhodesia. Bishop Muzorewa,
for example, was entirely dependent on the white controlled civil service and the
military to maintain himself in power and also to prosecute the war against the
guerrilla forces of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe."
This state of affairs was proof that Bishop Muzorewa's government was unable
to fulfil his promise to end the war. Anexample was that four weeks after the
signing of the internal agreement only hundred (100) guerrillas had surrendered.
All these proved to be the key factors in the failure oftheMuzorewa regime."
In conclusion, it seemed as if the internal settlement was rejected by the masses
and the international community perhaps because Joshua Nkomo and Robert
Mugabe had not participated in the election of April 1979 which swept
Muzorewa into power. If both Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere had
supported Bishop Muzorewa, the international community would almost
certainly havefollowed suit. It may well be true that in this case the long term
interests of Rhodesia were indeed served by non-recognition of Bishop
Muzorewa, but if so, this was mainly because recognition would not have
stopped the war and this in tum was largely due to Kenneth Kaunda and Julius
Nyerere's attitudes toward Bishop Abel Muzorewa's regime."
More importantly, Miles Hudson points out that Bishop Muzorewa v.:as
certainly not a man ofhigh intellectual calibre, but hewas in the endgenerally
able to bring about aconsensus within his party (VANe) and then to enunciate
it, which was indeed the traditional method adopted by Shona leaders."
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Despite his militant statements in Geneva and his outspoken condemnation there
of government atrocities, Bishop Muzorewa, however, was known to be a
moderate leader. Meredith says Bishop Muzorewa's lackofpolitical expertise,
which Ian Smith had discerned during their secret negotiations three years
before, was in fact both a drawback and an advantage."
Bishop Muzorewa was known by Smith and Joshua Nkomo as a political
nonentity, who had no practical experience ofhardships involved in the struggle
for the national liberation, hence his serious mistake when he got himself
involved in signing away a political document in 1978, which would have left
Smith and Colonialism in Zimbabwe for the next hundred (100) years."
Throughout his emergence after his renouncement of the mandate to lead the
ANC on temporary basis; the Smith regime welcomed him because of tribal
politics which were geared to divide the people. It is a well known fact that
between 1972 - 1978 Bishop Muzorewa never made anattempt to organize the
people politically for national liberation, but along tribal lines in order to satisfy
his own leadership aspirations."
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The role of lIi~hop MUlorewu'~ delegation during the Lancaster House
( 'onference,
~.l. Introduction.
From 01 to 07 August 1979 the Commonwealth l lcads ol'Govemment mel in
Lusaka. the capital city ofZambiu. These delegates, however. were meeting
just two months alter a general election in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia which swept
Bishop Abel Muzorewa into power. The election, however, had been declared
to be fairly conducted and above reproach by a former conservative colonial
secretary, Alan Lennox Boyd. I According to Charlton it was the commonwealth
leaders who had asked for this constitutional conference.' C. Legum says the
principals of the constitutional conference in Lusaka were to be only the British
government and the PF leaders. J for fear that the people who were insisting that
the PF should be included might be offended by the presence of Bishop
Muzorcwa's government.' This arrangement was necessary since the general
purpose of this conference was to try to amend the unacceptable internal
settlement constitution in order to S3tisfy the PF leaders, This arrangement gave
rise to anger inSalisbury because the Bishop's government had not been allowed
to come to Lusaka wtule the PF \\":1.", Invited.'
The conference w s chaired by Kenneth K:UUld:1 the PresIdent of 1..amb13
because Z3mb13 w s the host country 'J11e moun 31m of the conference \\'3." to
try and reach a consensus on measures to end the war and by c:suhh.\h a gcnume
Black Democratic majority government an Rhodesia' on a b3.\Is whrch the
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commonwealth and the international community as a whole would fmd
acceptable.' The objective was, however, two fold: the first requirement was
to see to it that a democratic constitution was in place; the second requirement
was that the government formed under such a constitution should be chosen
through free and fair elections. 8
Charlton states that this was the card Mrs Thatcher had come to play, even if the
British had hopes ofsomehow seeing to it that Bishop Muzorewa remained the
Prime Minister of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. This was, however, Mrs Thatcher's first
commonwealth conference." The commonwealth leaders were afraid that the
British plan was nothing but to bring Rhodesia to legal independence. However,
that plan was destroyed by the Lusaka Conference.'? This conference produced
anagreement which led to a constitutionalconference, which was to be held in
London, at Lancaster House. II The agreement was a victory for the
commonwealth leaders because Mrs Thatcher had in the meantime also moved
away from her original commitment of the recognition of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia
and the lifting of sanctions. 12
Lord Peter Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, therefore agreed and
accepted the demand made by the Commonwealth Heads ofGovernment for a
fresh start towards the resolution of the Rhodesian Conflict." Tamarkin argues
that the Commonwealth plan signed the death warrant of the internal settlement
of the 3rd March 1978 between Smith and Muzorewa. Indeed, the British
government did not waste anytime. On 14 August 1979,. it sent invitations to the
Muzorewa government and the PF to attend a final constitutional conference at
Lancaster House on September, 10, 1979. The Thatcher government, with a
new sense of mission and with newly discovered power stemming from the
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Commonwealth backing, was now more than ever before prepared to become
a dominant factor and actor in the process of resolving the conflict in
Rhodesia. 14
The remaining major stumbling block, therefore, was to persuade the Muzorewa
delegation to participate in the negotiations with the PF leaders at a conference
to be held in Lancaster House in Britain. This became a huge task for the role
players, Britain and the FLS Presidents, because the rival sides in the Rhodesian
conflict had not been brought together around the same negotiating table since
the abortive Geneva Conference in late 1976.15
Despite Bishop Muzorewa's initial hostile reaction to what had been agreed in
Lusaka, Britain's talks in achieving an all-party agreement was much less
difficult than had atfirst appeared likely. It was Robert Mugabe's tough demand
that eventually changed Bishop Abel Muzorewa's mind. Legum argues that
Bishop Muzorewa felt that the Patriotic Front's obdurate stand would mean that
they would not in fact be ready to go to London, and that this would give his
side an opportunity to negotiate alone with Britain. 16
In fact, this hope that the PF would prove intractable and that in the end, Britain
would have no option other than to come to terms with Bishop Muzorewa's
government was to become the strategy pursued by the Bishop throughout the
Lancaster House talks."
5.2. The objectives and aims of the major players.
According to C. Sylvester there were many reasons for each side to accept the
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invitation sent outon 14 August 1979 by the British government. Firstly, Britain
asthe host, wanted to settle the Rhodesian problem once and for all in order to
improve relations with the Third World. Secondly, both Mugabe and Nkomo
as well as other PF representatives were influenced toattend by the FLSP; many
ofwhich bore the ill-effects of continuing warfare in theregion. They wanted
to head off any turn of events that could strengthen the internal settlement
government in the eyes ofthe world and at home. IS
Davidow argues that even though Mugabe and Nkomo believed that a military
victory was still possible, they also recognised that the prospects for an early
triumph in the field were very small." For fifteen years successive British
governments had also failed in efforts to convince Smith, the then Prime
Minister of Rhodesia, to relinquish the control that he and approximately
200,000 white settlers maintained over Rhodesia's government and its black
population, which by 1979 numbered almost seven million.20
Another important factor in the PF leader's decision to attend was the influence
ofthe Front Line State Countries, notably Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique.
The prestige ofthe first two countries was atstake as they had played key roles
at the Lusaka ccnference talks. More importantly their economies, particularly
those ofZambia and Mozambique, were suffering a great deal as a result of the
Rhodesian war. Perhaps the most significant force compelling the PF leaders
to attend the conference, was their aim not to give the British government an
opportunity to recognise the Muzorewa regime. 21
Robert Mugabe, with his broad ethnic base and with hisguerrillas controlling
much of the Shona country side, had good reasons also to believe that Zanu
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could win the independence elections. Joshua Nimmo's electoral prospects were
not bright because of his narrow ethnic base. He could hope, however, to be
part of a winning PF party or to become a marginal, yet essential figure in a
coalition headedby either Robert Mugabe or Bishop Abel Muzorewa."
Bishop Abel Muzorewa urgently neededa vehicle to show the world that he and
his government were credible and legitimate." However, Bishop Muzorewa's
delegation's central objective in the conference was obtaining a long awaited
recognition from Britain of its legitimacy as a government and, flowing from
that, the lifting of international sanctions. An end to sanctions would mean more
funds available to the government to end the war and for development
programmes for the African majority."
Moreover, a duly recognised government would be able to call on friendly
nations for military assistance in combating the guerrillas. The ability to acquire
additional sources of foreign support, apart from that provided by the South
African government, was a major goal ofthe Muzorewa regime and could be
attained only after the lifting of sanctions and formal granting ofindependence
by Britain. Those goals could in tum, be met only by acting in co-operation
with Britain to find a suitable settlement. Davidow gives this as the main reason
why Bishop Muzorewa was so co-operative with Britain during the Lancaster
House talks."
Peter Gutkind argues that neither side went to the talks ~th enthusiasm. Bishop
Muzorewa was forced to go by the South African government and by the
recognition that the conditions for talks under the Tory Foreign Secretary could
be favourable to them."
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Tamarkin states that Bishop Muzorewa might have accepted the invitation
because he believed, orhoped, that at best the PF would perhaps withdraw from
the conference and he would get a second-class solution which would grant him
recognition and end the sanctions even without the participation of the PF
leaders. At worst, Bishop Muzorewa believed that he stood a good chance of
winning a free and fair elections. 27
5.3. Bishop Abel Muznrewa and the Lancaster House Conference talks.
Peter Carrington a British Foreign Secretary chaired a conference that the
British government had convened to find, once and for all, a solution to the
Rhodesian problem. The conference began with its deliberations in September
1979. Lord Carrington's difficulty was the bringing of the conference to the
point ofdecision.28 David Caute says Lord Carrington started with the terms of
the future Constitution of Rhodesia, then moved on to the transitional
arrangement, and concluded with the most sensitive subject, how to achieve a
ceasefire .29
This step-by-step approach was designed because Carrington saw it to have
multiple advantages moreover because partial agreements would serve as a hook
to keep the parties always negotiating." Davidow states that Carrington's team
was well unified. He was assisted by a small group of Foreign and
Commonwealth Office professionals. The foreign secretary himself was a
skill~d and experienced negotiator and his team had devised, a tactical plan."
The new proposed constitution made provision for eighty (80) black scats and
twenty (20) seats for the white electorate, but with only seventy (70) votes
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required for a constitutional change. All state institutions or levels of
government were put under the control ofthe Prime Minister and parliament.32
Davidow argues that Bishop Muzorewa might have unconditionally accepted
this constitution as put forward by Lord Carrington on 21 September 1979
because the white blocking powers, which were entrenched in the transitional
constitution were removed." But it was not acceptable to Ian Smith who
regarded it as a betrayal of white interests." This was a clear indication that
Bishop Muzorewa's black delegation was not entirely happy even during the
signing of the internal agreement on 3rdMarch, 1978 with the entrenched white
blocking mechanisms in the old constitution."
Charlton also argues that this acceptance ofthe newproposed constitution by
Bishop Muzorewa's delegation put the PF delegation in an awkward position
because therewas adanger that Lord Carrington may proceed without them to
the next stage." When Bishop Muzorewa accepted the new proposed
constitution, he was, however, so confident that he even dismissed speculation
that the British team was favouring the PF delegation during the negotiations by
giving them advantages as a Patriotic Front alliance."
The arrival of Pik Botha, the South African Foreign Minister in London was
seen by many, including the PF leaders, as an encouragement to Lord Carrington
to take the plunge into the second-class solution, namely to recognise the
Muzorewa - Smith internal settlement. Bishop Muzorewa was ready to
conclude such a deal with Britain if the PF leaders were not prepared to accept
the constitutional proposals. It was perhaps out of fear that the PF leaders
eventually accepted the proposition of twenty (20) seats reserved representation
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for whites in the Lower House on September 24, 1979.38
Martin and Johnson argue that the Lancaster House Conference was saved by
Bishop Muzorewa who did not want the talks to reach a stalemate. He believed
that he couldstill win an election if supervised by the British authorities." His
belief was strengthened by the fact that Pretoria once again would provide
substantial financial support for him to enable him to win the 1980 elections as
they did in 1979.40 If Bishop Muzorewa was not convinced that he could win
a free andfair election, it was doubtful whether an agreement would have been
reached."
At the conference, faced by the pressures from Mugabe, Nkomo and Carrington
as well as the FLP, Bishop Muzorewa was a somewhat pathetic and lonely
figure. He clung to the hope that the PF leaders would wreck the conference
and that thereafter Britain would belatedly recognise Ills administration and lift
the sanctions.
This beliefmay have been encouraged by the British threats ofimplementing
their "option two." Lord Carrington threatened that Britain would go ahead with
elections, independence, recognition of the elected regime and the lifting of
sanctions, even if the PF leaders would not agree on the next stage of talks and
the war continued."
Martin andJohnson convincingly argue that Bishop Muzorewa could not, at that
stage afford to be seen to be responsible for breaking up the conference,
because the guerrillas had brought Rhodesia to a point where itneeded peace
even more than recognition and the lifting ofsanctions. They also state that
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there was only one way for Bishop Muzorewa to end the war, and that was to
agree to a new internationally acceptable constitution and to the holding of new
British supervised elections."
On 15 October 1979 Bishop Muzorewa caught the world by surprise when he
announced his delegation's acceptance of elections supervised under the
authority of the British government. The onus as usual was again left on the PF
leaders. However, four days after Muzorewa's acceptance, they announced that,
ifthey were satisfied about the transitional arrangements, they would not need
to revert to the discussion of the constitution. 44
Xan Smiley in the Africa Confidential, says that Bishop Muzorewa's change
ofattitude during the talks was perhaps a result of the sharply changing mood
ofthe British policy-makers who told him that sanctions would not necessarily
be lifted ifhe refused to accept fresh elections and importantly the constitutional
changes."
Legum disputes the notion that BishopMuzorewa was simply Ian Smith's voice.
From the beginning he was a much tougher negotiator than was anticipated. His
true colours were revealed when he kept on insisting on referring to the PF
leaders as cowardly terrorists. Legum also attributes Muzorewa's co-operation
with the British team to the fact that he was strongly against the proposals that
the white minority should retain their veto right in any new constitution."
Charlton also argues that Bishop Muzorewa co-operated well with the British
government because he knew from the outset that if he walked out, Britain
would refuse to grant independence, and continue sanctions against Rhodesia.
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This threat. however, induced him to actively participate in the talks hoping that
the PF leaders would walk out so that Britain would be obliged to recognise his
legitimate regime and then lift sanctions."
But in the final analysis one could say Bishop Muzorewa's co-operation was
simply an indication of having a sense of patriotism, selflessness and high
degree of love for humankind. 48 However, by staying on at the negotiating
table; the Bishop had to keep on making concessions, one after another.
Charlton states that the Bishop was no verbal gladiator throughout the
conference. He says hewas a niceman, with the best of political manners; and
he was also sometimes too polite for words and so saidnothing."
From the talks it is clear that Bishop Muzorewa wanted to avoid another
breakdown of the conference. That would have been too costly." As Prime
Minister he had absolute power to wreck the conference as all the previous
governments did." But by not doing it, he won the admiration of the British
team, including those who were previously his enemies."
In the Zambia Daily Mail, it was reported that Bishop Muzorewa's handling
ofthe conference was an illustration that he was determined to end the fourteen
(14) year old rebellion in his country." Hence he agreed even when he was
requested to stepdown as Prime Minister ofZimbabwelRhodesia and give up
his authority as Rhodesia's first black nationalist leader to a British governor,
while another ejection took place. To the Bishop the sacrifice he was called
upon to make meant exploring the city ofthe soul.54 He was prepared to give
up the sweetness of power, especially that power accompanied by a fat
cheque."
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This offer to step down as Prime Minister in order to give the British governor
time to organise free and fair elections was yet another indication, on his part
of being willing to see the Rhodesian problem solved in a peaceful manner.
This was indeed abig sacrifice and it led to the PF delegation showing signs of
compromise.S6
Charlton describes his decision to step down as a Prime Minister as the end of
the chapter and the final eclipse of Ian Smith's internal settlement which he
entered into on the 3rd March 1978 with the African leaders inside the
country. 57
Even though the PF leaders and the guerrilla alliance - insisted on further
discussion onthe role ofthe judiciary and certain army units during the interim
period, Lord Carrington meanwhile welcomed formal acceptance by Bishop
Muzorewa's delegation of his document setting out the proposals for the
transition. 58
Once more Bishop Muzorewa accepted Lord Carrington's proposals for a
ceasefire at the Rhodesian constitutional conference in London on 26 November
1979. The delegation accepted the proposals eve!1 though many aspects of the
British proposals were extremely unpalatable, particularly the submission of the
Salisbury forces and police to the authority of a British governor.59 They
accepted it once again hoping that the conference may produce asecond- class
solution which represents an agreement between the Government of National
Unity (GNU) and the British government."
Soon after theacceptance of the British proposals the Bishop's delegation began
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to criticise and blame the Patriotic Front delegation for wasting valuable time at
the conference by absurd posturing and ridiculous delaying tactics."
Inconclusion, the pattern throughout the conference was that Bishop Muzorewa
accepted the British proposals withoutmuch ado. The tough bargaining only
remained with the PF delegation. This flexibility on the part of the bishop
helped Lord Carrington a great deal, because Bishop Muzorewa's tendency to
agree had become lever in the negotiations with the PF leaders. To make his
deadlines credible, he would threaten to support the second-class solution with
Bishop Muzorewa. In fact, the second-class solution served Lord Carrington
a great deal in his dealings with both sides."
Bishop Muzorewa's side did not have serious objections to what Carrington
proposed and this left the PF and Ian Smith in a dilemma." His readiness
acceptance to step down, though it was regarded as an abdication by Ian Smith,
was, however, a wise move because both parties could fight the elections on
what the British optimistically describedas equal terms."
During the Lancaster House talks, in the eyes of some observers, Muzorewa's
attitude saved the conference, but in so doing he lost any hope he might have
had of winning the elections. In the eyes of many Rhodesians he had
surrendered without a struggle an office he had won with their support, thus
opening the way for more militant leadership."
According to J. Davidow the Muzorewa and PF delegations were outgunned
and outmaneuvered by the British team in what mustbe regarded as one of the
United Kingdom's (UK) diplomatic triumphs." But Bishop Muzorewa himself
8S
saw the outcome ofthe talks as a victory for democracy and a crushing defeat
for totalitarian anarchy and terrorism." Legum argues that it was also the stand
taken by Bishop Muzorewa throughout the talks that destroyed Ian Smiths's last
hope to retain an element of white supremacy.68
On 05 December 1979 both Robert Mugabe and the rest of the PF delegation
agreed to the constitutional conference based on the plan as put forward at the
beginning of the talks by Lord Carrington, with some minor adjustments. The
agreement was, however, signed on December 21, 1979 by all the participants.
This agreement paved the way for the first fully democratic elections to be held
inZimbabwe in 1980.69
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CHAPTER 6.
Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the elections of 1980.
6.1. Introduction.
According to H. Wiseman and A.M. Taylor the Lancaster House conference
was indeed unique in the sense that for the first time in the history of Rhodesia
two opposing forces, the PF and the Muzorewa government had to co-operate
in achieving peace as well as a future constitution. The PF's presence at the
Lancaster House Conference demonstrated its will towork together with Britain
in bringing about genuine independence by holding a fresh elections. I
This is an indication that the elections held on 20 April 1979 were not as
important to'the PF leaders as it might have been expected but people voted,
clinging desperately to what they believed Bishop Muzorewa, as an African,
was their last hope against darkness and death. The mass of the Africans in
Rhodesia doubtlessly or doubtfully delighted that they were, at last, to have a
black Prime Minister and a black government. 2
6.2. Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the elections of 1980.
For the second time in less than a year the Rhodesian electorate went to the
polls. Two different polling dates were set aside for theelections of white and
.
black members ofthe new parliament. The election was to be conducted by the
Rhodesian administration but supervised by the British Election Commissioner
(BEC), Sir John Brynton. He was assisted by a fairly extensive staff of
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supervisors who were either senior British local government officers or ex-
colonial civil servants.'
By contrast, Bishop Abel Muzorewa's campaign begun in November 1979 while
the Lancaster negotiations were still in progress.' However, Bishop Abel
Muzorewa officially launched the campaign on 6 January 1980 at a rally
attended by about 50,000 people. S His manifesto made a series ofproposals for
a major reformation ofZimbabwean society. The significance ofthe manifesto,
however, lies in the absence of any claims to success during the UANC's six
months as Government."
In Keesing's Contemporary Archives it is reported that Bishop Muzorewa's
campaign was strongly based on warnings that a Mugabe or Nkomo government
would mean the nationalization of all aspects of life, and the effective
destruction of the economy.' It was based on the choice between democracy
and a one-party Marxist state. He .offered the continued stability and growth
which his government professed to represent. 8 But generally speaking his
campaign was full of unrealistic promises of peace, unity, reconciliation,
rehabilitation and prosperity under the VANe government." A. Verrier states
that Bishop Muzorewa was entirely convinced that with British and the South
African government help, he could repeat his success of the previous April. 10
M. Gregory argues that Bishop Muzorewa's major theme throughout the
campaign was to warn the electorate of the. dangers posed to Zimbabweans
traditional values by "Marxism and Communism." Much of Bishop Muzorewa's
election material was devoted to attacking the Zanu PF and the Patriotic Front
ofNkomo andtheir alleged desire to impose a Mozambique style regime upon
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Zimbabwe, instead of the promoting of Muzorewa himself. I I
During his campaign, Bishop Muzorewa also emphasized the origin of the ANC
in the rejection ofthe 1971 Anglo/Rhodesian proposals and its function at that
time, as the only instrument of unity for the nationalist parties."
According to the Herald, Bishop Abel Muzorewa also promised the people
dramatic land distribution after he had acknowledged that land hunger was a
crucial and genuine problem for the people." His promises also included free
primary education, major improvements in the health service and the necessity
to provide better housing, 14 a reconstruction programme involving the
replacement ofdestroyed schools, hospitals and clinics. He also promised better
opportunities for former combatants who might wish to resume their studies.
Crash training programmes would be provided for those wishing to follow
careers in commerce, industry and the public service. IS
He embarked on a country-wide election campaign tour, during which he
addressed an average ofsix meetings a day. But Muzorewa did not have an
overall election plan and at times had to use his auxiliary forces to intimidate the
opponents by assaulting and forcing them to sing political songs that were not
of their own choice."
His campaigning strategy, especially the staging of a country - wide
extravaganza, outraged his opponents. Both Mugabe and NImmo believed that
those people would vote for Muzorewa in a state of mind ofgratitude. 17
According to the Herald, this could be seen as one ofhis tactics to try and woe
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the voters, by giving them free food, refreshments and entertainment. These
were supplemented by free transport around the rural areas which was always
dominated by a helicopter. His campaign posters were in colour and his
advertisements in the local press clearly showed that he had stronger financial
backing than the other parties. IS
As Prime Minister, Muzorewa also confidently predicted massive foreign
investment under a free enterprise system, with jobs for everyone. 19 His hope
ofwinning again was raised by the fact that Mugabe was determined to dissolve
the PF, despite NImmo's vehement objections and to fight the election from his
Shona stronghold. Muzorewa was also convinced that his VANe party, being
heavily fmanced by the South African government and other Western Countries,
would come home a clear winner.20
The election campaign was not conducted in a free and fair way. The
Government of Bishop Muzorewa, with the help of the security forces and his
auxiliary army imprisoned thousands ofparty workers, banned Zanu PF leader
Enos Nkala, and also tried to bar the whole organization from campaigning in
two of the provinces." This was partly necessary because of a number of
violent incidents and intimidation, including attacks on election candidates and
party officials as well as several acts of terrorism directed against civilian
targets." By mid-February theattempts to weaken Zanu PF were so widespread
that some 2,500 Zanu PF members and supporters had been imprisoned."
The Patriotic Front guerrillas, especially those of Robert Mugabe, who gave
themselves up to the police, to be taken to an assembly area, were, however,
taken into detention in Shabani. Others became the target of several
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assassination attempts. The Patriotic Front often found it difficult to hold
meetings because of widespread intimidation by the RSF and Muzorewa's
private auxiliary armies."
It is a known fact that, during the 1980 election campaign Muzorewa's
auxiliaries intimidated other political parties by frequently following and beating
those who have attended non-VANC rallies. They also embarked on beating
villagers for attending meetings of other parties opposed to VANC policies."
In other areas like Fort Victoria, women were forced atgun point onto a bus
bound for a Salisbury VANC rally. A Zanu - PF bus was also hijacked and its
driver made to lie down in a ditch and submit to caning. The auxiliary forces
also frequently beat Zanu - PF sympathisers. In the rural areas people were
threatened withdeath and destruction oftheir houses ifthey voted for Zanu -
PF. All this wasdone to discourage them from voting for other parties.26
Andre Astrow states that the South African troops taking part in the campaign
toassist the Muzorewa VANe also intimidated opposition groups. Even though
the South African government denied that their troops were assisting Muzorewa,
they remained inside the country up to the elections date under the pretext that
they were protecting British interests."
In the final analysis, Bishop Muzorewa's army seemed to be actively
campaigning on his behalf. His auxiliary forces were reported in the Rand
Daily Mail of 19January 1980, to be forcing people toattend political meetings
sometimes organised by them. Usually at those meetings these people were
taught how to vote and warned against voting for any other party than the
UANC. These auxiliaries willingly made it difficult for other political parties
96
to campaign and organize freely. They also tore up posters ofrival parties and
warned people against attending any meeting not organised by the UANC. 28
Towards the end of the campaign it was obvious that Muzorewa's supporters
were becoming less and less. Many thousands turned up only for the free food
and drink that had been laid on since the beginning of the campaign. It was
mainly during this late stage that Bishop Muzorewa's election campaign was
marked by poor attendance at rallies throughout the country. The Bishop
repeatedly blamed this phenomenon on the intimidation by the supporters of
Mugabe's Zanu - PF and Nkomo's PF supporters."
6.3. Why Bishop Muzorewa lost the 1980 elections.
The elections for the 80 African seats were held for three days, 27,28 and 29
February 1980 but the white election was held earlier on 14 February 1980.30
The white, coloured and Asian voters returned the RF candidates with
overwhelming majorities in the six seats that were contested. The other 14 seats
went automatically to the RF as its candidates were unopposed."
In his analysis ofthe election, Gregory mentions that a total of nine parties .
contested the election for the 80 African seats. But according to him it was a
foregone conclusion that the vast majority of seats would be won by the three
main parties, namely Joshua Nkomo Zapu - PF, Robert Mugabe Zanu- PF and
Bishop Muzorewa UANC.J2
Before the election there was a perception that a hung parliament was inevitable.
If indeed there was to be a hung parliament Lord Soames, a British Governor
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who was empowered to choose a Prime Minister, preferred a Muzorewa/Nkomo
coalition and this reflected a belief that ifMuzorewa could notbe brought home
as an outright winner, the judges could disqualify his arch rival, Robert
Mugabe."
In the closing stages ofthe election campaign there were signs of an apparent
shift away by the voters from Muzorewa.34 This shift mostly occurred in areas
such as Mashonaland East, Manicaland, and Victoria which were dominated by
Zanu - PF, and other parties found it extremely difficult ifnot impossible to hold
rallies or conduct their campaign by open solicitation of support. This was true
for Nkomo as well as Bishop Muzorewa, because these areas had been
penetrated by the PF during the war, particularly in the Tribal Trust Lands
(TTLs) where Zanu - PF held sway.3S
However, this shift did not cause great alarm among the Muzorewa supporters
as they were confident of winning the elections." Charlton states that the
support Muzorewa enjoyed before the 1980 elections was largely conditioned
by the evident backing ofthe white community as well as hopes and expectation
that he would do well enough and that Nkorno might come in to broaden the
internal settlement and so, effectively, exclude Mugabe from power. He further
argues that up to about two or three weeks before the election, people still
thought that Muzorewa had at least a chance of either winning narrowly, or at
least gaining quite a nwnber of votes."
On election day, whites sent their domestic servants offwith a final instruction
to vote for the Bishop, and fanners took their labourers to vote with the same
instruction. In rural towns/areas, members of the Rhodesian forces had been
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holding private meetings with white employers telling them that their labourers
must vote for the Bishop if the whites future was to be assured."
The election results, however, proved the Muzorewa supporters and many so-
called election analysts wrong. The Patriotic Front (Zanu- PF) won a landslide
victory which left Lord Soames without any other option except to ask Robert
Mugabe to form agovernment. The election results were as follow:
Votes Cast % of Valid Votes Seats
Zanu - PF 1,668,992 62,992 57
Nkomo - PF 638,879 24,113 20
VANC 219,307 8,277 339
Generally speaking the election itself had been successful and this was reflected
in the very high turnout of 20 2275 people voted representing 93,6% of the
estimated electorate as compared to the 1869077 representing 64,9% of the
estimated electorate who voted in April 1979.40
In the April 1979 elections the Bishop swept all 27 seats, in anaverage poll of
77,7%.41 In contrast, in the 1980 elections the Bishop won only 3 seats." He
failed even to retain some elements of power which would have given him the
mandate to form a coalition government with Ian Smith." However, lesser
parties faired even more poorly. This was because the young people, mujibas
who were acting as agents and scouts for the PF. and guerrillas who had
remained outside the Assembly Points/Areas (AP. or A.A). These people were
accused of intimidation and direct violence to individuals, groups and the entire
communities." The PF cadres therefore easily carriedon political activity of all
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forms throughout the considerable parts of the country under its control and
sometimes in other areas as well. 45
Criticism of the election process of 1980 was mainly directed at some of the
Governor's decisions, the presence of South African troops in Rhodesia
throughout the election period and the vexed question ofintimidation. During
the election only Muzorewa publicly supported their presence." Most of them
were reported by the team of observers that they were stationed at the Beit
Bridge which is the major road link between Rhodesia and South Africa." But
the almost complete eclipse of Muzorewa during the election was a major
surprise to nearly all the people inside and outside Rhodesia."
Mozorewa's DANe officials were not altogether surprised by the results
because during the campaign they already acknowledged privately that they did
not expect to win anoverall majority, but hoped to gain asufficient number of
seats to be the leading partner in an anti-Mugabe coalition with Joshua Nkomo's
PF.49
But, however, Muzorewa was heavily defeated in this election, seemingly
because he failed to make a tangible difference to the lotofthe ordinary people
in the period of six months and nine days of his rule as Prime Minister of
ZimbabwelRhodesia. It was a period during whichwarhad escalated and the
misery it caused made the bishops promises ofpeaceand harmony look empty.50
The shift of support from Muzorewa was partially caused by his election
campaign of 1979 when he promised the electorate thathe would bring peace;
something he was unable to deliver. 51 Andre Astrow argues that the Internal
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Settlement hadclearly failed to promote stability notonly in rural areas but in
Urban areas as well." The stability of white society was therefore being
severely undermined by this war. Casualties on both sides continued to grow
enormously after the signing of the agreement. The infiltration of freedom
fighters from all comers of Zimbabwe severely stretched the resources of the
security forces. As a result most of the African inparticular were left without
proper protection against the guerrillas and the mujibas." Because of all these
Muzorewa lost all credibility with the majority of theAfrican people and the
war continued to intensify unabated.S4
Blacks also criticised him for failing to bring about a noticeable improvement
in their general standard of living. They rejected him because life had gone on
almost unchanged since he took office, with whites still holding the best jobs,
retaining their wealth, property and privilege, and holding onto the main levers
ofpower through the army and public service. ss
Generally, the white support Muzorewa enjoyed at that time was clearly a
drawback in black nationalist eyes. This support from the white community
promoted him tostatus ofa puppet of Smith in Rhodesia. After giving up hope
that they could ward off black majority rule indefinitely, whites pinned their
hopes on him, giving him an image in certain quarters as a guardian and
protector of white interests, while on the eyes of blacks a puppet. S6
While, on the 0!1e hand, white support had given him a strong boost, it also, on
the other hand caused the mantle of black nationalism to slip from his shoulders;
something that proved a major factor in the elections of 1980. It was no secret
that he also received massive material and moral support from the South African
lOl
government and that proved to be a disaster in the black nationalist
constituency, because he was seen as a Smith puppet."
Muzorewas' support also shifted to Mugabe because of the politicization
process of people which was carried out in the rural areas by the group of
people called mujibas. These young Africans helped to mediate between the
guerrillas and the peasants. They were the watchdogs ofthe Tribal Trust Lands
(TTLs) controlled by ZanuiZanla as they knew the people who lived in the area
and couId provide important security information to theguerrillas. They helped
to co-ordinate and organise the frequent political meetings, pungwes, in the
TTLs. The chimbwidos - women and girls who fulfilled many of the same
functions as the mujibas - were also centrally involved in the task of
politicization. These women helped to co-ordinate and organise the political
meetings as well and often acted as messengers for theguerrillas because they
incurred less suspicion than did the mujibas. This local organization helped to
strengthen ZanuiZanla's support amongst the rural population and worked to
accelerate the collapse of the Puppet government in these areas/regions. S8
The total disintegration of the UANC's support can also be attributed to the
Party's failure to achieve any of its election pledges when in office and the
alienating effect upon the voters of Muzorewa's acceptance ofSouth Africa's
warm embrace." But truly speaking Muzorewa could not have done anything
since the guerrillas had steadily extended their control over Rhodesia's rural
areas, and the RSF res~urces were severely stretched."
Though it was a second election for Muzorewa in less than a year, black
Rhodesians voted overwhelmingly because they hadbeen cruelly scourged by
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the war." Sylvester states that Mugabe was elected because of the
propagandistic writings by some of the reporters who drew attention to the
popular beliefthat only Mugabe and the PF party could stop the war, control the
guerrillas and provide honest and articulate leadership." The outcome was not
surprising since the blacks probably voted for the party or leader they thought
would offer the best chance of making the ceasefire permanent. Bishop
Muzorewa suffered from the stigma of having failed to end the war after blacks
voted him into power the previous April, 1979.63 His defeat was so humiliating
that even his complaints of intimidation" by Zanla and the constant reminder by
the Zanu - PF supporters that the war would continue ifMugabe was not elected
carried no weight though it had the effect to the voters."
Finally, Muzorewa also lost the elections of 1980 because his political
organization was based primarily on the UMC of Rhodesia ofwhich he was a
Bishop. In the Africa Today R.T. Libby states that Muzorewa had no party
organization per se at the local levels as did the nationalists like Nkomo and
Mugabe. The reason for this is that Muzorewa's initiation into Zimbabwe
national politics came at a time when all African national organizations had been
banned by the RFP government and all major nationalist leaders were in
detention or exile."
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion.
It is evident from this study that Muzorewa played a significant role as a
politician in the independence struggle in Zimbabwe. Firstly, he can be credited
with helping unify his own divided nationalists at that time.' He succeeded in
mustering widespread support amongst black and white in rejecting the Smith
-Home proposals during the test of acceptability conducted by the Pearce
Commission in 1972.2
The outcome ofthe referendum was a victory and not only for him but to the
politics of Zimbabwe in general.3 Their rejection ofthe proposals rudely shook
the Smith regime as it was a sign of rejection of white supremacy by the
Africans.' Muzorewa rejected the proposals because the people did not trust
Ian Smith whom they thought would tear up any constitution which threatened
his political power base. 5
During this period, Muzorewa displayed his leadership qualities when he made
acall on the British government to convene a Constitutional Conference in 1972
with the full African representation." From the outset, however, Muzorewa was
not a decisive leader in Zimbabwe nationalist politics. His image as a new
capable leader was blown up by the imperialist media for their own end.' But
he failed to live up to this image because he adopted a too cautious and
compromising approach in dealing with the Smith regime.' It is this cautious
approach in politics that made him look like Smith's puppet and weak negotiator
as well."
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Muzorewa also failed to live up to expectations because he saw his role as being
purely temporary and therefore was reluctant to be drawn into the depths of
politics. This is one ofthe reasons why he was unable to give direction to the
entire process. He was not a politician but a bishop of the UMC. He was
actually not concerned with politics as such, but merely to see through an issue
which he considered amoral one. His main objective at the time was to see the
disbandment ofthe ANC as soon as the exercise was over, a signal which
sowed division among the Zanu and Zapu supporters."
During the first conference at the Victoria Falls, Muzorewa's objective was to
see the talks succeed and bear fruit. II He was therefore determined to achieve
majority rule and end the RFP rule which he labelled totalitarian and Fascist."
In his opening speech he urged the negotiators on both sides to rise above
personal and selfish ambitions. He said the time was ripe for the people of
Rhodesia to enter a new andpositive relationship between black and white. He
clearly stated that the ANC was determined to achieve a peaceful settlement.
His willingness to negotiate must, however, not be misunderstood to be a sign
of'weakness." It is here where he demanded black majority rule as well as an
amnesty for the exiled leaders. But the conference adjourned because both
negotiators failed to reach a consensus."
It was during this conference when a division occurred between Muzorewa and
Nkomo. Nkomo rejected Muzorewa's leadership of the VANe because he saw
him as being manipulated by Smith to safeguard white interests. Nkomo never
regarded him asanationalist leader who had become Smith puppet because he
was not a freedom fighter. IS Nkomo also criticized and rejected Muzorewa's
leadership at the time because he was not a public speaker and lacked the
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courage of his convictions. According to Nkomo the bishop was clearly not a
true leader. This was one of the reasons why Smith managed to win his favour
and then exploited him because he had neither political experience nor
direction. 16
Muzorewa's leadership qualities were also visible during the Geneva Conference
talks. During these talks he was no longer the chairperson ofthe VANe but a
representative of his ANC party while Nkomo and Mugabe represented their
newly founded PF. During the discussion Muzorewakept on reminding Smith
that the nationalists were there only to take back their own country. He also
demanded a one man one vote constitution and independence within twelve
months.'? He also called for the election ofan interim government on a one man
one vote basis and for the representation of political parties in the government
ofnational unity on the basis of theirelectoral strength." During this conference
he displayed true leadership qualities. He attended not in a spirit of give and
take but tooka firm stand on the principle ofblack majority rule. 19 It was during
these talks that he accused the PF delegation of creating an anti-democratic front
along with the white minority regime by opposing the elections for the interim
government. 20
His weaknesses, however, during this period were also obvious. It was clear
that he was notschooled in the realities ofthe nationalist politics. As a bishop
of the UMC, he was totally lacking in the ruthlessness which was becoming
essential for an effective leader. This is one of the reasons why Mugabe and
Nkomo decided to gotheir own way."
Bishop Muzorewa made history when he agreed to discuss internal settlement
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arrangements with Smith in 1977, after the aborted Geneva Conference. His
courage was seen when he agreed to sign an agreement on the 3rd March 1978.
It was this agreement which threw offonce and for ever the yoke of Colonialism
in Zimbabwe. 22 But by participating in this process, the Africans rejected him
because they regarded his actions as an act of betraying his own people for the
benefit of the whites."
During the internal settlement negotiations, he was indeed more accommodating
to white Rhodesian wishes than the other VANC leaders." It is from this date
that Muzorewa changed his leadership style and continued to show a very
singular lack ofstrong political leadership."
During the Lancaster House talks, Muzorewa played a significant role as
mediator. 26 It was clear thathe wishedto avoid a breakdown ofthe conference
because that would have been too costly." As Prime Minister he had absolute
power to wreck the conference as all the previous governments did." But by
not doing it, he won the admiration ofthe British team including those who were
once his enemies."
His weaknesses, however, once again became clear during the Lancaster House
Conference. Muzorewa's uncritical acceptance of Lord Carrington's proposals
left much to be desired." He did not have the skillsor the courage to negotiate
with the more polished and highly skilled British team as well as the PF.J 1
Despite his strengths and weaknesses as a negotiator, Muzorewa's role as
"Substitute leader" from 1971 was three fold: firstly he was nominated as the
chairperson of the ANC inorder to muster-widespread support for the rejection
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of the Smith-Home proposals. It is this mammoth task that blew him up as a
decisive leader in the nationalist politics in Zimbabwe during the test of
acceptability."
The second task for Muzorewa was to try and unify the ever divided African
nationalist leaders sothat they could speak with one voice and fight together as
a team towards achieving majority rule in Zimbabwe. But the unity which had
been achieved between 1974 and 1975 did not last long. The nationalists went
to the Geneva Conference divided like before."
The third taskfor Muzorewa was to stop the war and improve the lot of the
needy people in Zimbabwe. Muzorewa could not stop it simply because the
people rejected his leadership and therefore war continued unabated. This
occurred when his interim government had been in power for at least six months
and nine days; almost half of that period had been spent in the negotiations at
Lancaster House. It is therefore clear that this period, whatever he thought to
achieve for the nation, especially for the needy and the underprivileged black
section of the community, the period was too short to bring about any
meaningful change. The government was also severely restricted and hampered,
by the fact that sanctions were still being enforced."
Therefore it is not surprising that Muzorewa suddenly lost support as a Prime
Minister of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia because he closely identified himselfwith Ian
Smith, moreso by his participation in the internal settlement. By mere
participating in it, people labelled him a Smith puppet." They reached the
conclusion that as a Smith puppet he was not in the position to be able to effect
visible changes particularly in those departments run by whites. He could not
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do anything unless sanctioned by Smith who wasa minister without portfolio.
This contributed to his failure to bring about striking social and economic
changes and rapidly eroded black support both for him and for the internal
government as well.36
The bishop's waning image as a political leader was also dealt further blows by
his total dependence upon the RSF to protect his position. As Smith's puppet,
his government heavily relied upon South Africa to prop up its counter
insurgency campaign." Muzorewa did not have the power or the courage to
backup his own minister on the vital issue of reforms in the police and the
judiciary. Heeven failed to take a decision when Byron Hove was dismissed
as co-minister ofLaw and Justice soon after his appointment."
When the time was ripe Muzorewa also surrendered his position of
responsibility at the request of Britain for the sake of a quick solution.
Muzorewa as arepresentative of all the people of ZimbabwelRhodesia-thus also
ofthe white community. He swallowed his pride and agreed to dismantle his
regime, step down as the Prime Minister and hand over power to a British
Governor. This shows that he was acting on behalfof Smith and the rest of the
white community.",
The final proofto show that the bishop was Smith's puppet, was the fact that he
fought both elections, 1979 and 1980 with the massive financial support from
white South Africa. He was backed by this country and others to enable him to
win and then be the custodian of whites in Rhodesia."
Bishop Muzorewa was the only nationalist leader during this election who
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supported the presence of the South African troops in the country. His party
also promised to trade openly with South Africa if it won the 1980 elections."
The Africans in Zimbabwe turned en masse against him because his regime was
nothing but an extension of the RFP government. They wanted to be free of
white rule regardless whether it was under a black prime minister or not. In
their perception and experience, Muzorewa was notonly a failure, but he had
betrayed their hopes and his own promises that there would be peace and
prosperity. War continued unabated instead."
In the later stages of the struggle for freedom Muzorewa was also rejected by
his 0\\111 church followers after heavily entertaining them and trying to buy their
votes withmoney from his masters. He was rejected as a curse to his Christian
Community. Western countries and South Africa who poured millions into his
campaign got only three seats in thenew parliament ofZimbabwe. Their puppet
was finally rejected."
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